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ROE AT THIRTY-SIX AND BEYOND: ENHANCING
PROTECTION FOR ABORTION RIGHTS THROUGH STATE
CONSTITUTIONS
LINDA J. WHARTON*

ABSTRACT

In a series of decisions over the past three decades, the Supreme
Court has seriously undermined Roe v. Wade's promise of full and
meaningful federal constitutional protection for women's access to
abortion. While the new Obama administration will enhance protection for reproductive rights at the federal level, the reality remains
that reconstituting the Supreme Court with a majority of Justices
amenable to fully restoring Roe's strict protections will likely take
many years. This Article considers whether state constitutions are
a promising avenue for enhancing protection for abortion rights.
This Article looks back on thirty years of reproductive rights
litigation under state constitutions to evaluate the strategy of using
state constitutions to advance protection for abortion rights. Part I
of the Article provides an overview of the major jurisprudential developments on abortion at the federal level, highlighting the steady erosion of protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the multiple obstacles to successful legal challenges
under current law. Part II reviews the sources of protection for abortion rights available under state constitutions and describes the history of reproductive rights litigation in the state courts, highlighting
both selected state court decisions that have provided expansive
protection for abortion rights and those that have not. Part III evaluates the advantages and drawbacks of a state constitutional law
litigation strategy and offers suggestions for future reproductive
rights litigation in the state courts. The Article concludes that state
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constitutions are playing an important role in safeguarding abortion rights in individual states in an era of diminished federal constitutional protection and hold promise for influencing a return to
expanded protection at the federal level. Although independent state
constitutional adjudication is not without limitations and pitfalls,
it offers a fruitful alternative venue for continued litigation as one
component of a broad-based strategy that includes litigation in federal courts, legislative advocacy, public education, political action,
and grass roots organizing.
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INTRODUCTION

Thirty-six years after the United States Supreme Court's historic
decision in Roe v. Wade,' the decision survives, but only as a shadow
of its former self. While never directly overruling Roe, in a series of
decisions over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has seriously undermined Roe's promise of full and meaningful federal constitutional protection for women's access to abortion. Several years
after Roe, the Court approved laws that denied poor women2 and
young women 3 full access to abortion. Then in PlannedParenthood
of SoutheasternPennsylvania v. Casey,4 decided in 1992, the Supreme
Court discarded the highly protective strict scrutiny standard of Roe
and instituted a new undue burden standard for measuring the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion. The Casey plurality insisted
that it intended to provide a level of protection for the abortion right
that was fully consistent with Roe's core objective of"ensur[ing] that
the woman's right to choose not become so subordinate to the State's
interest in promoting fetal life that her choice exists in theory but
not in fact."' As interpreted by the lower courts and later applied by
the Supreme Court itself, however, the undue burden standard has
proven to be far less protective of abortion rights than the Roe standard.6 Most significantly, in its 2007 decision, Gonzales v. Carhart,'
a newly constituted Supreme Court dramatically reversed course
when it upheld the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.' The
Court had struck down a similar Nebraska ban in 2000 because it
did not allow the procedure when necessary to protect a woman's
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325-26 (1980) (holding that Federal Medicaid
program is not required to fund all medically necessary abortions even where it funds
childbirth); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358,369 (1980) (holding that state law restrictions
on medically necessary abortions, comparable to those in Federal Hyde Amendment, are
constitutional); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977) (holding that a state participating
in Federal Medicaid program is not required to pay for nontherapeutic abortions even
where state funds childbirth); see infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 11), 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (approving mandatory parental consent for minors seeking abortion so long as the state also provides
an alternative judicial bypass procedure); see infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
4. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
5. Id. at 872.
6. See generally infra Part I (discussing judicial application of the Casey undue
burden standard).
7. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). Justice Samuel Alito cast the critical
fifth vote necessary to sustain the federal ban. Id. at 130. In 2006, Justice Alito replaced
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, a key member of the Casey plurality. See infra notes 15557 and accompanying text.
8. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2004);
Carhart,550 U.S. at 133.
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health,9 but in an opinion filled with anti-abortion terminology and
rhetoric, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Carhartmajority, found
that the intentional omission of a health exception posed no undue burden on women. 10 Moreover, in a striking shift in the Court's
discourse on abortion, Justice Kennedy put great emphasis on the
"ethical and moral concerns" implicated by the procedure11 and paternalistically justified the ban as necessary to protect women who may
later "come to regret their choice. '' 12
Not surprisingly, the erosion of federal constitutional protection
for abortion has led to an avalanche of legal restrictions on abortion"
that, coupled with the harassment and stigmatization of abortion
providers, have made it difficult for many American women to access
abortion services and for physicians to perform them. As governmental restrictions have mounted, the number of abortion providers
in the United States has declined dramatically; 4 four states - North
Dakota, South Dakota, Mississippi, and Wyoming - have only one or
two providers in the entire state.' 5 In these and other states, women
must make long, costly trips to reach a provider. 6 The impact can be
especially burdensome on young women, poor women, rural women,
and those who are victims of physical abuse and sexual assault.'7
9. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 929-30 (2000); see infra notes 132-47 and
accompanying text.
10. Carhart,550 U.S. at 164-65.
11. Id. at 158.
12. Id. at 159.
13. These restrictions include mandatory waiting periods, informed consent scripts
that force doctors to give their patients information biased against abortion, licensing
and regulatory laws burdening abortion providers with restrictions not applied to other
comparable medical providers, detailed reporting requirements, consent and notification
requirements for minors, abortion procedure bans, prohibitions on public funding for
abortion, and prohibitions on coverage of abortion in private insurance. See GUTTMACHER
INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LAWS (2009), http://www
.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibOAL.pdf; GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN
BRIEF: ABORTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (2009), http://www.guttmacher.org/state
center/spibs/spibARR.pdf; NARAL Pro-Choice America, Who Decides? The Status of
Women's Reproductive Rights in The United States: Targeted Regulation of Abortion
Providers (TRAP) (2009), http://www.naral.org/choice-action-center/in-yourstate/whodecides/fast-facts/issues-trap.html.
14. See Rachel K. Jones et al., Abortion in the United States: Incidence andAccess to
Services, 2005, 40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6 (2008). The number of abortion
providers in the United States has been on the decline since 1982. Id. at 6 ("Between
1982 and 2000, the number of abortion providers declined by about 38% .... "). Between
2000 and 2005, the number of providers decreased by an additional 2%. Id. at 10. An
estimated 87% of U.S. counties had no abortion provider in 2005. Id.
15. Id. at 11.
16. Id. at 14 (concluding "that some women travel long distances to obtain an abortion"
and noting that nine to ten percent of women in southern and midwestern states must
"travel more than 100 miles to access [abortion] services").
17. See id. at 14 (documenting barriers women encounter in accessing abortion services
based on where they reside and their ability to pay). For an excellent examination of the
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For these women, the cumulative burden of forced parental consent,
waiting periods that may require multiple long distance trips to a
provider, and onerous licensing laws that increase the cost of abortion may cause them to delay or entirely forego their abortions.' 8
State-based campaigns to ban abortion are also on the rise. 9 In
2006, the South Dakota legislature passed, but voters rejected, the
nation's first post-Casey criminal ban on abortion.2" In November
2008, South Dakotans again defeated a ballot initiative to ban abortion in that state;2 ' Coloradans considered and rejected an effort to
amend their state constitution to define personhood as beginning
at the moment of fertilization.22 At the same time, under the Bush
administration, programs aimed at reducing the need for abortion
by preventing unintended pregnancies have lost federal funding as
support for "abstinence-only" programs replaced federal support for
comprehensive sexuality education.2 3
realities of abortion access in rural women's lives, see Lisa R. Pruitt, Toward a Feminist
Theory of the Rural, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 421. Professor Pruitt points out, for example,
that "[a] woman without a car, living in Boulder would... have to borrow a car or hitchhike to Parowan [143 miles from Boulder], and then make a four-hour bus journey to
Salt Lake City, the site of the nearest abortion clinic." Id. at 473; see also Evelyn Nieves,
S.D. Makes Abortion Rare Through Laws and Stigma, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2005, at Al,
A10 ("For some [South Dakota] women, the only way to do it - and not pay for a hotel
room - is to make the 700-mile trip in one day.").
18. See, e.g., Jones et al., supra note 14, at 14 ("[S]ome women may be unable to obtain
an abortion because of circumstances such as distance, gestational limits and cost.");
Theodore Joyce et al., The Impact of Mississippi's Mandatory Delay Law on Abortions
and Births, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 653, 655 (1997) (studying the impact of Mississippi's
1992 mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period and finding that the total rate of
abortions for Mississippi residents decreased by approximately 16%, the proportion of
Mississippi residents traveling to other states to obtain abortions increased by 37%, and
the proportion of second-trimester abortions among all Mississippi women obtaining
abortions increased by almost 40%).
19. See NARAL Pro-Choice America, Abortion (2009), http://www.prochoiceamerica
.org/issues/abortion/.
20. Women's Health and Human Life Protection Act, 2006 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 119
(imposing a criminal ban on abortions in all cases except when necessary to preserve a
woman's life). A successful petition drive in South Dakota halted implementation of the
law and secured a statewide vote on its validity. Monica Davey, South Dakotans Reject
Sweeping Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at P8. On November 7, 2006, a
majority of voters in South Dakota rejected the ban. Id.
21. Monica Davey, S. Dakotato Revisit Restrictionson Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2008, at A14; Tiffany Sharples, Ballot Initiatives: No to Gay Marriage,Anti-Abortion
Measures, TIME, Nov. 5, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/
0,8599,1856820,00.html.
22. See Sharples, supra note 21. In California, a measure to mandate parental
notification for young women under eighteen was defeated for the third time. Id. Abortion
ban ballot initiatives in Missouri and Montana failed to garner sufficient support to qualify
for the November 2008 ballot. NARAL Pro-Choice America, supranote 19.
23. Cynthia Dailard, The Other Shoe Drops:FederalAbstinence EducationProgram
Becomes More Restrictive, 9 GutrMACHER PoLy REV. 6, 6 (2006), http://www.guttmacher
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While the new Obama administration is poised to enhance protection for reproductive rights at the federal level, the reality remains
that reconstituting the Supreme Court with a majority of Justices
amenable to fully restoring Roe's strict protections will likely take
many years.14 As a result, commentators have wisely urged the development of a long-term, comprehensive, strategic plan to restore abortion rights that includes a broad range of strategies - political action,
grass roots organizing, public education, and litigation- and emphasizes meaningful access not only to abortion, but to the full range of
policies essential to women's reproductive autonomy.2 5 Increasingly,
St 26
legal commentators are calling for a rethinking of litigation strategy.
Some have emphasized that post-Casey litigation and advocacy must
vigorously challenge the cumulative burden of the multiple, incremental obstacles to abortion that effectively foreclose access to abortion
for many women." Others have argued that litigators must counteract diminished protection under Roe's due process/privacy analysis
by recasting abortion rights in sex equality theory 28 or other federal
.org/pubs/gpr/09/1/gprO9Oll9.html. The number of abortions performed in the United
States has declined in recent years. See Jones et al., supra note 14, at 6. "Almost twothirds of the decline .. .can be traced to eight jurisdictions with few or no abortion
restrictions" and a commitment to comprehensive sexuality education. Editorial, Behind
the Abortion Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2008, at A16.
24. The Justices most likely to be replaced in the near future are Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and perhaps Souter - all members of the Court's liberal bloc. Accordingly, in
the short term, Obama's presidency will likely mean that the Supreme Court's current
balance is preserved. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court'sDirectionHinges on Who
Wins '08 Race, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2008, at A2 (discussing the potential effects of the
outcome of the 2008 presidential election on the makeup of the Supreme Court). President
Bush's nominations to the lower federal courts have also pushed the composition of those
courts to the right; President Obama is expected to roll back the conservative advantage
in the lower federal courts, but creating a Democratic advantage in these courts will likely
take until 2013. Charlie Savage, Appeals Courts Pushed to Right by Bush Choices, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2008, at Al, A14.
25. See Dawn E. Johnsen, A ProgressiveAgenda for Women's Reproductive Health
and Liberty on Roe v. Wade's Thirty-FifthAnniversary,AM. CONST. SOC'YFORL. & POLY,
Jan. 2008, at 10, http://www.acslaw.org/files/Johnsen Issue Brief 01 08.pdf (arguing that
a comprehensive progressive pro-choice agenda must include policies that support healthy
pregnancies, prevent unintended pregnancy, and oppose "politicization and distortion
of reproductive health care information and services"); see also JESSICA ARONS, MORE
THAN A CHOICE: A PROGRESSIVE VISION FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RIGHTS (Center
for American Progress 2006), http'J/images1.americanprogress.org/il80web20037/cap/more
_than_a_choice.pdf (arguing for an expansive definition of reproductive rights that casts
abortion as one of a wide range of reproductive rights issues).
26. Johnsen, supranote 25, at 6.
27. See, e.g., id. at 9-10 (arguing that "[t]he obstacles to abortion ... that are most
underappreciated and in need of attention are those already in place or soon to come,"
including "the literally hundreds of state abortion restrictions that are designed both to
sound reasonable and to stop the performance of abortions as effectively as a criminal
ban").
28. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their
Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007)
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constitutional theories,29 or by using subconstitutional doctrines, such
as administrative law, to challenge certain restrictions.3 0
This Article considers the viability of another litigation strategy:
challenging abortion restrictions under state constitutions. In our federal system of dual sovereignty, although state courts are, of course,
bound by Supreme Court decisions limiting federal constitutional
guarantees, they may exercise independent judgment when construing provisions of their own constitutions.3 During the past several
decades, as the Warren Court revolution subsided and protection for
individual rights under the Federal Constitution steadily waned, state
courts have repeatedly invoked the liberty and equality guarantees
of state constitutions to give broader protection than that available
or likely available under the Federal Constitution.3 2 In this way,
states have protected individual rights in a wide range of areas,
[hereinafter Siegel, Sex Equality] (discussing a sex equality approach to reproductive
rights); Reva B. Siegel, The New Politicsof Abortion: An Equality Analysis of WomanProtectiveAbortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 [hereinafter Siegel, The New
Politics] (arguing that abortion bans based on gender stereotypes violate the Equal
Protection Clause). For other earlier scholarship advocating the use of sex equality
theory in the abortion context, see Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under
Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical
Perspectiveon Abortion Regulation and Questions of EqualProtection,44 STAN. L. REV.
261 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in ConstitutionalLaw (with Special Reference
to Pornography,Abortion, and Surrogacy),92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992). See generally Reva
B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex EqualityRight: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in MOTHERS IN
LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 43, 64-65 (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) (surveying equal protection arguments
advanced by leading legal scholars in the 1980s and early 1990s).
29. See, e.g., Eileen McDonagh, The Next Step After Roe: Using FundamentalRights,
EqualProtectionAnalysis to Nullify Restrictive State-Level Abortion Legislation,56 EMORY
L.J. 1173, 1181 (2007) (arguing that a promising way to challenge abortion restrictions
"entails refraining abortion rights as the right of a woman to consent to pregnancy...
and ... invoking the fundamental rights model of equal protection analysis'); Robert Post,
Informed Consentto Abortion:A FirstAmendment Analysis of Compelled PhysicianSpeech,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939 (analyzing First Amendment freedom of speech implications of
abortion laws that compel specific physician speech). See generally WHAT ROE V. WADE
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION's ToP EXPERTS REWroTE AMERICA'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL
DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (collection of alternatives to the Court's opinion in
Roe by leading constitutional law scholars).
30. See Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and Administrative Regulation, 56
EMORY L.J. 865, 906 (2007) (arguing that administrative law challenges to abortion restrictions "may hold greater promise" than federal constitutional law challenges).
31. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) ("State constitutions, too, are a font of individual
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the
fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law - for
without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.").
32. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at xvii (2008); Brennan, supra note 31, at 495.
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including public school financing, same-sex marriage equality, and
intimate association. 3 Historically, abortion has also been an area
in which challenges have been brought under state constitutions. 4
Indeed, California's Supreme Court recognized "[t]he fundamental
right of [a] woman to choose whether to bear children" in invalidating its ban on abortion four years before the Supreme Court decided
Roe.3 5 The post-Roe movement to litigate in state courts began soon
after the Supreme Court allowed restrictions on poor women seeking
abortions.36 In the years between Roe and Casey, state constitutional
challenges focused on laws that curtail young and poor women's
access to abortion by requiring parental involvement or restricting
public funding for abortion. 7 Following Casey, additional challenges
have been brought outside these contexts. 3 As a result, a substantial
body of state constitutional law jurisprudence in the area of reproductive rights has developed.
Are state constitutions a promising avenue for safeguarding
abortion rights in individual states? Can they play a meaningful role
in ultimately restoring Roe's protections at the federal level? This
Article looks back on thirty years of reproductive rights litigation
under state constitutions to evaluate the strategy of using state constitutions to advance protection for abortion rights. Part I provides
an overview of the major jurisprudential developments on abortion
at the federal level and highlights the steady erosion of protection
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
multiple obstacles to successful legal challenges under current law.
Part II reviews the sources of protection for abortion rights available
under state constitutions and describes the history of reproductive
rights litigation in the state courts, highlighting both selected state
court decisions that have provided expansive protection for abortion
rights and those that have not. Part III evaluates the advantages
and drawbacks of a state constitutional law litigation strategy and
offers suggestions for future reproductive rights litigation in state
33. For a comprehensive and useful overview of how state courts have used state constitutions to advance liberty and equality interests in these and other areas, see SHAMAN,
supra note 32.
34. Steven A. Holmes, Right to Abortion Quietly Advances in State Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1998, at Al.
35. People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Cal. 1969) (relying on both federal and
state law precedent and emphasizing "[t]hat such a right is not enumerated in either the
United States or California Constitutions is no impediment to the existence of the right).
36. See supra note 2.
37. See generally infraPart II.B (discussing state court challenges to parental involvement laws and restrictions on public funding for abortion).
38. See infra Part II.B (discussing post-Casey state court challenges to mandatory
waiting periods, biased patient counseling provisions, and laws regulating the medical
practice of abortion providers).

20091

ROE AT THIRTY-SIX AND BEYOND

477

courts. The Article concludes that, although they are not a panacea,
state constitutions are playing an important role in safeguarding
abortion rights in individual states in an era of diminished federal
constitutional protection and hold promise for influencing a return
to expanded protection at the federal level.
I. THE EROSION OF PROTECTION FOR ABORTION RIGHTS UNDER THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

The Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade represented
the high-water mark for abortion rights in the United States.3 9 During
the thirty-six years that followed, an emerging conservative majority
prevailed in sharply reducing the scope of protection available under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4" Rulings
from the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have severely
limited facial challenges to abortion restrictions, undermined protection for women's health, and weakened the Casey undue burden
test by "imposing unattainable evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs." 4
Consequently, the ability of reproductive rights litigators to mount
successful challenges under the Federal Constitution to the many governmental restrictions that hamper women's access to abortion has
been substantially diminished. These obstacles to successful federal
challenges are discussed below.
A. The Supreme Court'sFramework for Assessing Restrictions on
Abortion: From Roe's Strict Scrutiny to Casey's Undue Burden
Standard
In its landmark seven to two ruling in Roe, the Court invalidated
Texas's criminal ban on abortion.4 2 The Court did far more, however,
than prohibit the most draconian abortion laws. In fact, the Court
found that the right to make decisions about whether to end a pregnancy is a fundamental right of privacy protected from governmental
intrusion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 3
As such, all restrictions on abortion were examined under the strict
scrutiny standard.44 Under this standard, only laws necessary and
39. GLORIA FELDT, THE WAR ON CHOICE: THE RIGHT-WING ATTACK ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS
AND HOW TO FIGHT BACK 5 (2004).

40. Linda J. Wharton et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 385 (2006).
41. Id.
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
43. See id. at 153-55 (relying on the liberty component of the Due Process Clause).
44. See id. at 155, 163.
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narrowly tailored to serve the most compelling state interests pass
constitutional review. 4' The Court recognized only two state interests as sufficiently compelling to justify governmental restrictions
on abortion - the state's interests "in preserving and protecting the
health of the pregnant woman" and "in protecting the potentiality of
human life."4 6 The Court crafted a trimester framework as a means
of safeguarding the woman's interest in abortion while accommodating the government's interests.4 7 Under this framework, restrictions
on previability abortions were only permitted if the government could
prove that they served to protect women's health.' The state's interest
in potential life was not sufficiently compelling to override a woman's
right to choose abortion until the point of viability. 49 Even then, the
state interest was deemed paramount only in cases in which the
woman's life or health was not endangered by continued pregnancy. °
In the two decades following Roe, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a wide variety of restrictions in more than a dozen
cases. Soon after Roe, however, the Court's narrow application of its
principles dealt a major setback to young and low-income women
seeking abortions. In Maher v. Roe and Harrisv. McRae, the Court
sanctioned restrictions on public funding for abortion, declining to
closely scrutinize them and explicitly permitting governments to
discriminate between childbirth and abortion in their allocation of
funds.5 ' Privacy, the Court reasoned in McRae, was guaranteed for
"the freedom of a woman to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy," " but the government could support one decision and not the
other.5 3 The woman's privacy right was nonetheless constitutionally
intact because "although government may not place obstacles in the
path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not

45. Id.
46. Id. at 162.
47. Id. at 163.
48. Id. The Court found that the state's interest in protecting the pregnant woman's
health became compelling "at approximately the end of the first trimester." Id.
49. Id. Viability is the point in pregnancy at which the fetus can live outside the
pregnant woman's womb. Id.
50. Id. at 163-64.
51. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977); see supra note 2.
52. McRae, 448 U.S. at 312 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 324-25. The Court also found no violation of the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection because the Hyde Amendment neither impinged upon a fundamental
constitutional right nor differentiated in its treatment of a suspect class. Id. at 322.
Therefore, the Court declined to apply the strict scrutiny standard of review. Id. at 326.
The Court found that the federal restrictions were rationally related to the government's
"interest in protecting potential life." Id. at 325.
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remove those not of its own creation."5 4 Similarly, in Bellotti v.
Baird,5" the Court denied equal access to reproductive choice for
young women when it allowed states to require minors seeking abortion to obtain parental consent so long as the state provided an alternative judicial bypass procedure through which women could seek
a waiver of the requirement.5 6
These decisions severely hampered young and poor women's
access to abortion. Yet, in other contexts during the 1970s and early
and mid- 1980s, a dwindling majority of the Court repeatedly applied
Roe's strict scrutiny to invalidate not only abortion bans, but also
a vast array of restrictions that encumbered the abortion choice
with delay, administrative hurdles or expense, or disproportionately
57
harmed young, rural, low-income, or battered women.
54. Id. at 316. But see id. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[W1t is not simply the
woman's indigency that interferes with her freedom of choice, but the combination of her
own poverty and the Government's unequal subsidization of abortion and childbirth....
The fundamental flaw in the Court's due process analysis... is its failure to acknowledge
that the discriminatory distribution of the benefits of governmental largesse can discourage
the exercise of fundamental liberties just as effectively as can an outright denial of those
rights through criminal and regulatory sanctions.").
55. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellottifl), 443 U.S. 622 (1979). In a plurality opinion, the Court
justified its refusal to equate the rights of minor women seeking abortion with those of
adult women on three grounds: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental
role in child rearing." Id. at 634. The Court also explained that an alternative judicial
bypass procedure was necessary so that parental involvement would not amount to "an
absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto." Id. at 643. The Bellotti II standard was approved
in subsequent opinions. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kan. City, Mo. v. Ashcroft,
462 U.S. 476,491-93 (1983) (sustaining Kansas parental consent requirement accompanied
by judicial bypass because the bypass procedure complied with Bellotti II); see alsoHodgson
v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 417, 455 (1990) (invalidating two-parent notice requirement,
but sustaining Minnesota law because of presence of judicial bypass procedure); Ohio v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron I1), 497 U.S. 502, 510 (1990) (sustaining one-parent
notification requirement accompanied by judicial bypass procedure, but leaving open
question whether judicial bypass procedures are required for notice statutes); H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 398,411,412 n.22 (1981) (sustaining Utah law requiring physicians to notify the parents of a minor, "if possible," prior to performing an abortion, but
not addressing whether Utah must provide alternatives to parental notification).
56. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643. The Court stated that the question before it was
whether the law provides for parental involvement "in a manner that does not unduly
burden the right to seek an abortion." Id. at 640; see also McRae, 448 U.S. at 314 ('The
doctrine of Roe v Wade, the Court held in Maher, 'protects the woman from unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy ... ' (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74)); Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 1), 428 U.S.
132, 147 (1976) ("[A] requirement of written consent.., is not unconstitutional unless
it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion."), affd, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
57. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
759-72 (1986) (invalidating biased patient counseling and public disclosure requirements),
overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); City
of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc. (Akron 1), 462 U.S. 416, 426 (1983)
(invalidating mandatory twenty-four hour delay, biased patient counseling, doctor-only
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The "constitutional tide" began to turn with the elections of
Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush and their appointments of
a combined total of five new Justices to the Supreme Court.5 8 More
Justices began to criticize Roe in dissenting opinions.59 Then, in
1989, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a plurality of the
Court called for "reconsideration" of Roe's trimester framework and
reviewed Missouri's abortion restrictions only to determine whether
they were "reasonably designed" to advance a legitimate state interest.' The Court did not overrule Roe because, remarkably in light of
her prior opinions,6 ' Justice O'Connor, the critical fifth vote, concurred in sustaining the Missouri restrictions, but wrote separately
to say the case was not the proper one for reconsidering Roe.6
Three years later, with two new Bush appointees, Justices Souter
and Thomas, in place, the Court appeared poised to overturn Roe
when it decided PlannedParenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvaniav.
counseling, and second-trimester hospitalization requirements), overruled in part by
Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-75
(1976) (invalidating spousal and parental consent requirements); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 193-200 (1973) (invalidating accredited hospitalization requirement, hospital review
committee approval, and two-physician concurrence requirement).
58. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 24 (2d ed. 1992).
Presidents Reagan and Bush appointed five Justices: Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, and Thomas. For detailed discussions of the changes in the composition of the
Supreme Court during the 1980s and early 1990s, the political strategies that led to those
changes, and how the Court's new composition affected its support for Roe, see DAVID J.
GARRow, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V.
WADE 637-89 (2d ed. 1998) and TRIBE, supra, at 16-20.
59. See, e.g., Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 782-83 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[Elvery
Member of the Roe Court rejected.., abortion on demand. The Court's opinion today,
however, plainly undermines that important principle, and I regretfully conclude that
some of the concerns of the dissenting Justices in Roe... have now been realized."); id.
at 786 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.) ("I continue to believe that this
venture has been fundamentally misguided since its inception."); Akron I, 462 U.S. at
458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ('CThe Roe framework ... is clearly on a collision course
with itself."). Justice O'Connor argued that the Roe trimester framework and strict
scrutiny standard should be replaced by an undue burden standard. Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 828-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Akron I, 462 U.S. at 461-64 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kan. City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 505
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
60. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 517-20 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
joined by White and Kennedy, JJ.) (arguing "that the rigid trimester analysis of the
course of a pregnancy enunciated in Roe has [made] constitutional law in this area a
virtual Procrustean bed" and urging "reconsideration" of the trimester framework because
it had proven "'unsound in principle and unworkable in practice"); id. at 521 (concluding
that the case before it offered "no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe," thus leaving "it
undisturbed," but acknowledging that "[t]o the extent indicated in our opinion, we would
modify and narrow Roe and succeeding cases'). In contrast, Justice Scalia urged that Roe
be overruled "explicitly." Id. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
61. See supra note 59.
62. Webster, 492 U.S. at 525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
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Casey.63 Instead, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, with Justice Souter,
co-authored a rare joint opinion that reaffirmed what they deemed
the central tenets of Roe. 4 Relying heavily on the doctrine of stare
decisis,6 5 the joint opinion upheld "the right of the woman to choose
to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue
interference from the State."6 6 It also reaffirmed "the State's power
to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or health."6 7
Finally, the joint opinion confirmed "the principle that the State has
legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting
the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become
a child."68
Departing from Roe, however, the Casey plurality rejected the
strict scrutiny standard and the trimester framework, replacing them
with a more permissive "undue burden" standard that allowed government greater authority to restrict previability abortions.6 9 The
Casey plurality emphasized that the state's interest in potential life
exists "from the outset" of the pregnancy v° and, therefore, unlike
Roe,"1 allowed regulation of all previability abortions to promote
the state's interest in either protecting potential life or preserving
women's health, so long as the restrictions rationally further these
state interests and do not unduly burden women's access to abortion. 2 Applying this new standard to the challenged Pennsylvania
63. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Following the
Webster decision, Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall, strong supporters of Roe v. Wade, resigned from the Court. GARROW, supra note 58, at 688-89;
TRIBE, supra note 58, at 243. President George H. W. Bush appointed David Souter to the
Court in 1990 and Clarence Thomas in 1991. GARROW, supra note 58, at 688-89; TRIBE,
supra note 58, at 243. Casey marked the first opportunity for these new Justices to
consider the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion. See TRIBE, supra note 58, at
243. It was widely predicted that Justice Thomas, in particular, would provide the fifth
vote needed to overturn Roe. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 795-

96 (2d ed. 2002) ("It was thought that either [Souter or Thomas], and particularly Justice
Clarence Thomas, might cast the fifth vote to overrule Roe v. Wade.!); Linda Greenhouse,
The Evolution of a Justice, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 10, 2005, at 28 ("As the country waited
for an answer from the court [in Casey] and with a presidential campaign well under
way, advocates on both sides gave Roe little prospect of surviving.").
64. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. For a lengthy discussion of the Casey litigation history
and a detailed analysis of the opinions of the Court and the evolution of the undue burden
standard, see Wharton et al., supranote 40, at 323-42.
65. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853-69.
66. Id. at 846.
67. Id.
68. Id.

69. Id. at 872-79.
70. Id. at 869.
71. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
72. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872. The Casey plurality also shifted the burden of proof, requiring challengers of abortion restrictions to show in the first instance that the statute
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abortion restrictions, the Court for the first time upheld restrictions
on abortion, including a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period,73
a biased patient counseling provision,"4 and detailed clinic reporting
requirements,7 5 which it previously had held unconstitutional.7 6 In
upholding these provisions, the plurality placed little weight on extensive findings by the district court that documented the serious burdens
posed by these requirements and turned a blind eye to the outmoded
and offensive stereotypes about women on which they rested.77
Yet, despite this reduction in protection, the Casey plurality also
signaled that the new undue burden standard was meant to offer
some degree of continued meaningful protection for women's reproductive autonomy. First, the plurality emphasized the link between
reproductive autonomy and women's equality and thus moved the
Court toward a firmer constitutional grounding for the abortion right
that has long been championed by feminist legal scholars.7" Second,
in defining the undue burden standard, the joint opinion disavowed
past iterations of the standard, including Justice O'Connor's prior,
more narrow formulation,79 and defined the test more broadly:
"unduly burdens" the abortion right. See id. at 877-79. In contrast, under Roe, once
plaintiffs proved that a statute created more than a de minimis impact on a woman's
right to choose abortion, the state bore the burden of demonstrating that the provisions
were narrowly drawn to serve a compelling purpose. Id. at 929 & n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973).
73. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-87.
74. Id. at 881-85.
75. Id. at 900-01. The Court also sustained Pennsylvania's narrow definition of
"medical emergency" and its requirement that minor women seeking abortion obtain the
informed consent of one parent before the abortion. Id. at 879-80, 899-900.
76. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 76063 (1986) (invalidating Pennsylvania's biased counseling provision and clinic reporting
requirements); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc. (Akron 1), 462 U.S. 416,
450 (1983) (invalidating, inter alia, Ohio's physician-only biased counseling and mandatory
twenty-four hour waiting period provisions).
77. Wharton et al., supra note 40, at 335-37.
78. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 ('The ability of women to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives."); id. at 851-52 ("At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life....
Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in
all instances. That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to
the human condition and so unique to the law."); id. at 898 (rejecting the husband notice
requirement, in part, on the grounds that it reflected "a view of marriage consonant with
the common-law status of married women but repugnant to our present understanding
of marriage and of the nature of the rights secured by the Constitution"); id. at 928
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("A State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality."); see supranote
28; see also TRIBE, supranote 58, at 256 (arguing that through an "emphasis on equality,
the [Casey] plurality sketched out a new jurisprudential foundation of the right to choose
that is in many ways constitutionally firmer than the approach in Roe").
79. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 ('The concept of an undue burden has been utilized
by the Court as well as individual Members of the Court, including two of us, in ways
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A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because
the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not
hinder it.s

Therefore, as framed by the Casey plurality, the test ostensibly encompasses both regulations that unduly burden women seeking abortion and also those created by the government with that purpose in
mind."' Third, the Casey plurality's application of the new standard
showed that it was strong enough to require the facial invalidation of
two of the challenged Pennsylvania restrictions: the husband notification requirement and its related reporting provision. 2 Importantly,
in scrutinizing the husband notification provision, the joint opinion
authors emphasized that the burden must be analyzed by looking
at the group of women affected by the restriction, "not the group for
whom the law is irrelevant."8 3 The plurality thus explicitly repudiated
an argument advanced by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that
would have denied protection to the very women affected by the husband notification requirement because the group consisted of only a
small number of women.' In invalidating the husband notification requirement on its face, without requiring proof that it would be invalid
in all circumstances, the Court also implicitly rejected the application
of the tough standard of United States v. Salerno, which requires
facial challengers to prove that there is "no set of circumstances...
under which [the challenged restriction] would be valid." 5 Instead,
the plurality undertook a fact-bound, highly contextualized assessment of the evidentiary record and invalidated the husband notification requirement because the challengers had shown that "in a large
that could be considered inconsistent.... [I]t is important to clarify what is meant by an
undue burden.") (citations omitted); id. at 879 (noting that it was "refin[ing] the undue
burden analysis" used by the lower court). As originally formulated in Akron I, Justice
O'Connor had defined undue burden as an "absolute obstacle[ ] or severe limitation[ ] on
the abortion decision." Akron I, 462 U.S. at 464 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
80. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added). Other than substituting the words
"substantial obstacle" for undue burden in this passage, the joint opinion offered no clearer
explanation of the meaning of the phrase "undue burden." Id.
81. While the addition of this "purpose prong" seemed to expand the scope of protection
available under the undue burden standard, the joint opinion offered no guidance on its
application or meaning.
82. Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98, 901; see Wharton et al., supra note 40, at 332-35.
83. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894.
84. Id.
85. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), rev'd, 505 U.S. 317 (1992).
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fraction of the cases in which [the legislation] is relevant, it will
operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion." 6 Fourth, while sustaining the other Pennsylvania restrictions, the plurality limited their conclusions about these provisions
to the facts before them in the existing record, v thus leaving the
door open to subsequent, as-applied challenges to the Pennsylvania
provisions and facial challenges to similar laws in other states.8 8
To summarize, while the Casey plurality did not sanction the
criminalization of abortion, it seriously eroded Roe. And although
the Casey joint opinion offered some basis for optimism that abortion
rights would be meaningfully protected in the future, the Court's description of the new undue burden standard and perplexingly inconsistent application of it left many unanswered questions that generated
much uncertainty. Unlike Roe, whose standards were familiar and
easily applied, the novel, fact-intensive, open-textured undue burden
standard would need to be applied in subsequent cases before its full
contours became clear.
B. Post-Casey JudicialApplication of the Undue Burden
Standard
Not surprisingly, following the Casey decision, those seeking to
limit or deny women's access to abortion moved forward with full
speed in adding new restrictions on abortion. Consequently, during the
past seventeen years, laws targeted at both women seeking abortions
and abortion providers have proliferated across the United States. 9
86. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895. In criticizing the Casey joint opinion, scholars have
correctly noted the inconsistency between the plurality's careful assessment of the husband notification provision and its cursory review of most of the other provisions of the
Pennsylvania law. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden
Standard: Orienting Casey in ConstitutionalJurisprudence,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025,
2035-36 (1994) (discussing inconsistent application of the undue burden standard in the

Casey joint opinion).
87. For example, in upholding Pennsylvania's mandatory waiting period, the joint
opinion authors noted that they were doing so based "on the record before [the Court]
and in the context of this facial challenge." Casey, 505 U.S. at 887.

88. See Wharton, et al., supra note 40, at 338-39.
89. See supranote 13. For example, the number of states that force women to listen
to state-prescribed information and then wait for a specified period, usually twenty-four

hours, before the abortion is performed has nearly doubled since 1992. At the time of the
Casey decision, thirteen states had mandatory waiting period laws on the books and
none were being enforced because the Supreme Court had ruled them unconstitutional.
Terry Sollom, State Legislation on Reproductive Health in 1992: What Was Proposedand
Enacted, 25 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 87, 88 (1993). Currently, twenty-four states impose these
mandatory waiting periods on women seeking abortion. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE
POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION (2009), http://www
.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib-MWPA.pdf. In thirty-three states, "women [must]
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Reproductive rights litigators in turn responded with a steady stream
of lawsuits that challenged the facial validity of these laws under the
Federal Constitution. This section discusses a sampling of the lower
court opinions in these challenges, as well as the Supreme Court's own
post- Casey jurisprudence. These decisions illustrate the multiple barriers to broad and meaningful protection for abortion rights under
prevailing federal constitutional law jurisprudence.
1. Lower Courts'Applicationof the Undue Burden Standard
Lower courts have had many opportunities to apply the Casey
undue burden standard to assess the constitutionality of a wide range
of restrictions on abortion.9" The standard has provided strong protection against abortion bans 9 ' and laws requiring women to notify
husbands and boyfriends before ending a pregnancy.92 Also, at least
up until the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,9
discussed below, the lower courts consistently applied the principles
of Roe and Casey to invalidate bans on specific abortion procedures.'
With respect to most other kinds of abortion restrictions, however,
(including waiting periods, biased counseling provisions, and laws
regulating the medical practice of providers) the success rate in postCasey challenges has been much lower.9 5
receive counseling before an abortion is performed: 23 of these states" require women to
receive state-prescribed counseling, often biased against abortion, before an abortion
procedure. Id. As part of this biased counseling, six states force providers to give women
information that "inaccurately assert[s] a link between abortion and an increased risk
of breast cancer"; eight states require information on the fetus's purported ability to feel
pain; nineteen states require information on possible physiological responses to abortion,
with seven of these states including only alleged negative emotional responses. Id.
90. For a more thorough review and analysis of lower courts' application of the undue
burden standard, see Wharton et al., supra note 40, at 353-85.
91. See, e.g., Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1992) (invalidating
Louisiana's criminal abortion ban); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865, 880 (D. Utah
1992) (invalidating Utah's criminal abortion ban), affd in part, reu'd in part, 61 F.3d
1493 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd, Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 1377 (1996); Guam Soc'y of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422, 1423 (D. Guam 1990) (invalidating Guam's criminal abortion ban), affd, 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1992); see also supra
notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing current efforts to enact abortion bans).
92. See, e.g., Coe v. County of Cook, No. 96 C 2636, 1997 WL 797662, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 24, 1997) (dismissing a claim against a county hospital that performed an abortion
on the plaintiffs girlfriend without notifying him), affd, 162 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 1998);
Jane L., 809 F. Supp. at 877 (invalidating Utah's husband notification requirement).
93. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); see infra notes 155-76 and accompanying
text; see also Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128, 131 (4th Cir. 2008)
(invalidating Virginia abortion procedure ban and distinguishing Virginia's ban from the
federal abortion procedure ban upheld in Carhart).
94. See Wharton et al., supranote 40, at 374-77 (discussing lower court decisions that
invalidated state bans on abortion procedures).
95. See id. at 357 n.221.
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Challenges to mandatory waiting period and counseling provisions have failed in the lower courts even where challengers have
supported their claims with strong evidence of their probable burdensome effects in pre-enforcement challenges." In many of these cases,
the courts misconstrued or narrowly applied the undue burden standard.9 7 Some courts have made the mistake of mechanically imposing
the result in Casey to sustain counseling and waiting periods, rather
than assessing the specific evidentiary record to decide whether these
provisions would unduly burden the women of a particular state.98
This approach reflects a misunderstanding of Casey. Although Casey
upheld Pennsylvania's waiting period and biased counseling provisions based on the limited record before the Court, these same provisions may still be invalidated if they prove burdensome in states
where the number and location of abortion providers and other specific circumstances render a waiting period unduly burdensome due
to long travel distances and consequent increases in cost and delay.9 9
While other courts correctly recognize that "Casey [did] not preordain [the] result""° in all subsequent challenges, many nonetheless
96. See id. at 357-67 (analyzing post-Casey lower court decisions on mandatory waiting
periods and biased counseling provisions and noting that research found only three cases
with reported decisions that invalidated these provisions on federal constitutional privacy
grounds).
97. Id. at 357-59.
98. See, e.g., Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482, 1487 (D. Utah
1994) (sustaining Utah's mandatory waiting period, reasoning that "[blecause the two
visit requirement is constitutional in Pennsylvania, it must also be constitutional in
Utah - especially in the context of a facial challenge"), rev'd in partand dismissed in part,
75 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995); Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Sinner, 819 F. Supp. 862,
864-65 (D.N.D. 1993), affd sub nom. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526
(8th Cir. 1994) (sustaining North Dakota's mandatory waiting period and counseling
requirement based on similarities between North Dakota provisions and Pennsylvania
provisions upheld in Casey); see also Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1341-42 (5th
Cir. 1993) (applying facial challenge standard of Webster and sustaining Mississippi's
mandatory waiting period and biased counseling provision based on Casey); Barnes v.
Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 14 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (same).
99. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing how the joint opinion in
Casey upheld Pennsylvania's mandatory waiting period); see also Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey (Casey 1), 510 U.S. 1309,1313 (1994) (opinion in chambers by Souter,
J., as Circuit Justice for the 3d Cir.) (denying plaintiffs' application for a stay of mandate,
but noting "that litigants are free to challenge similar restrictions in other jurisdictions,
as well as these very provisions as applied"); Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507
U.S. 1013, 1014 (1993) (mem.) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (clarifying that lower courts
must "specifically examine[ ] the record developed in the District Court" through a factintensive analysis of the particular restrictions before the court).
100. Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 453, 457 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (mem.)
(sustaining Kentucky's mandatory waiting period and counseling provision based on a
"presumption of constitutionality" established in Casey); see also A Woman's Choice E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 693 (7th Cir. 2002) (sustaining facial
validity of Indiana's mandatory waiting period and demanding proof not "open to debate"
that the restriction was "bound to" affect Indiana women in an unconstitutional manner).
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raise the evidentiary bar in pre-enforcement challenges so high that
mounting a successful challenge is virtually impossible. The decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati Women's
Services, Inc. v. Taft provides a recent example of the heavy burden of
proof imposed by some lower courts. In CincinnatiWomen's Services,
the court of appeals affirmed a district court ruling that upheld Ohio's
mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period and biased counseling
provision." 1 The law forces Ohio women to make two in-person visits
to their health provider in order to have the abortion procedure. °2
Plaintiffs challenged the burdensome impact of the law on battered
women.0 3 As described by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, proof
at trial showed that: (1) of the patients for whom an in-person counseling session warranted an exception under providers' own existing
policies, approximately 25% were battered women;10 4 (2) for these
women, "appearing in person twice is difficult, and in some cases, lifethreatening;"'0 ° (3) half of the battered patients (12.5% of the total
number of women excused under existing protocol) "would be precluded altogether,"'0 6 and the requirement of two in-person visits
would likely deter them "'from procuring an abortion as surely as if
[Ohio] has outlawed abortion in all cases."" 7 While acknowledging
that plaintiffs had "amassed an impressive amount of data, akin to
the data available in Casey on the issue of spousal notification,"l0 ' the
court of appeals nonetheless rejected the challenge because it found
that plaintiffs had not shown that a sufficient number of battered
women would be denied access to abortion:
[N]o circuit has found an abortion restriction to be unconstitutional under Casey'slarge-fraction test simply because some small
percentage of the women actually affected by the restriction were
unable to obtain an abortion. Although a challenged restriction
need not operate as a de facto ban for all or even most of the
women actually affected, the term "large fraction," which, in a
101. Cincinnati Women's Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 372-74 (6th Cir. 2006).
102. Id. at 364-65.
103. Id. at 372.
104. Id. Prior to the enactment of the challenged law, providers typically required
most patients to make two visits to the clinic - one for a counseling session and one for
the abortion procedure. Id. at 365. Under the providers' existing protocol, however,
approximately five to ten percent of patients are excused from having to make two visits
because of personal circumstances, and in these instances informed consent counseling
is done on the telephone. Id.
105. Id. at 373.
106. Id. at 372.
107. Id. at 373 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894
(1992)) (alteration in original).
108. Id. at 372.
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way, is more conceptual than mathematical, envisions something
more than the 12 out of 100 women identified here.10 9
This analysis is at odds with the holding of Casey. Indeed, in Casey,
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania made the identical argument
that Ohio made in CincinnatiWomen's Services: spousal-notification
posed no undue burden because its effects would be "felt by only one
percent of the women who obtain abortions.... [Moreover] some of
these women will be able to notify their husbands without adverse
consequences or will qualify for one of the exceptions." "0 The Casey
plurality squarely rejected this argument, refusing to deny protection to the very women impacted by forced spousal notice because
this group consisted of only a small number of women: "The analysis
does not end with the one percent of women upon whom the statute
operates; it begins there.""'
Other lower courts have narrowed the scope of protection potentially available under Casey by failing to assess the effects of waiting
periods, counseling mandates, and laws regulating the practice of
abortion providers from a contextualized, fact-sensitive perspective
that incorporates the real life circumstances of the girls and women
actually impacted by these laws. As a result, many courts tend to
minimize the burdensome impact of the cost increases, delays, travel
burdens, and other hardships caused by abortion restrictions. In
Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant,"2 for example, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court's entry of a permanent injunction against an onerous South Carolina law that singled out abortion providers for medical licensurel" and conditioned
109. Id. at 374.
110. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894; see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
111. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894; see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng.,
546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006) (finding a constitutional violation if the statute is enforced
without a health exception where "[iun some very small percentage of cases... women[]
need immediate abortions to avert serious and often irreversible damage to their health").
112. See Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 66 F. Supp. 2d 691 (D.S.C. 1999), rev'd,
222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Women's Med. Prof. Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595,
599,604 (6th Cir. 2006) (sustaining Ohio licensing provision that required plaintiff-abortion
provider to "have a written [patient] transfer agreement with a local hospital" even though
the requirement would cause the provider, which served 3,000 women annually, to shut
down completely); Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 860 F. Supp. 1409,
1420 (D.S.D. 1994) (rejecting the challenge to South Dakota's physician-only counseling
requirement even though the requirement would raise the cost of abortion in a state with
a high poverty rate and only one abortion provider), affd, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995).
But see, e.g., Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 2004) ("A
significant increase in the cost of abortion or the supply of abortion providers and clinics
can, at some point, constitute a substantial obstacle to a significant number of women
choosing an abortion.").
113. Greenville Women's Clinic,66 F. Supp. 2d at 696. The licensing requirement applied
to abortion providers who performed more than an occasional first-trimester abortion.
Id. South Carolina did not generally require licensing of other medical facilities. Id. at 697.
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the granting of the license on compliance with twenty-seven pages of
detailed requirements relating to the operating practices of the pro114
vider, including the size, staffing and maintenance of the facility.
Following a lengthy bench trial and "after spending months reviewing all aspects of [the] case,"" 5 the district court found that the law
would likely impose an undue burden on South Carolina women seeking abortions because it would cause a substantial rise in the cost of
abortion services, "at a minimum, between $30.00 and $75.00" and
"[i]n one area of the state, [would] result in an increase of between
$100 and $300, or result in the elimination of services altogether." '16
In reversing the trial court, the Fourth Circuit disregarded that
court's factual findings and substituted its own inferences about the
likely impact of the price increases on South Carolina women." 7 In
doing so, the court of appeals minimized the hardships posed by the
cost increases and speculated that, if one clinic closed, women could
easily travel seventy miles to another clinic." 8 These conclusions drawn not from the evidentiary record but apparently from their personal life experience - ignored the real life challenges of poverty,
youth, and violence that exacerbate the hardships of abortion restrictions for many South Carolina women.119 Moreover, the errors of this
approach are compounded by courts' tendency to examine the impact
of each restriction in isolation from other restrictions. Women usually
do not experience abortion restrictions one by one, but rather in conjunction with a raft of other restrictions that limit access to abortion.
By ignoring the cumulative burdens of abortion restrictions, courts
effectively "allow... state[s] to pile on 'reasonable regulation' after
'reasonable regulation' until a woman seeking an abortion first ha[s]
to conquer a multi-faceted obstacle course."12
114. See id. at 698-704. Prior to Casey, challenges to these kinds of laws were often
successful. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1369-75 (7th Cir. 1988) (invalidating Illinois statute imposing licensing and numerous other administrative requirements on abortion providers); Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505
F.2d 1141, 1151 (7th Cir. 1974) (invalidating city health board's regulations on abortion
services); see also Wharton et al., supranote 40, at 367-74 (analyzing post-Casey challenges
to laws targeting the medical practice of abortion providers).
115. Greenville Women's Clinic, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 732.
116. Id. at 735.
117. See Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 170 (4th Cir. 2000).
118. Id.
119. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hamilton sharply criticized the majority for their
narrow approach:
While traveling seventy miles on secondary roads may be inconsequential
to my brethren in the majority who live in the urban sprawl of Baltimore ...
such is not to be so casually addressed and treated with cavil when considering the plight and effect on a woman residing in rural Beaufort County,
South Carolina.
Id. at 202 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
120. Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The
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Finally, just as many lower federal courts have made it very difficult to show that an abortion restriction will have an actual impermissible effect on women's access to abortion, so too have they made
challenges based on a law's improper purpose exceedingly difficult.'21
Lower courts tend either not to undertake a Casey "purpose prong
' 122
[analysis] or to conflate it with [analysis of] the effects prong."
Other courts have rejected purpose prong challenges to waiting
period and biased counseling provisions by reflexively imposing the
result in Casey rather than undertaking a serious analysis of evidence of improper legislative motive. 123 Even where lower courts have
been willing to engage in an independent "purpose prong" analysis,
especially following the Supreme Court's treatment of this prong in
Mazurek v. Armstrong,124 discussed below, absent an express admission of improper purpose by defendants, courts have been extremely
reluctant to invalidate abortion restrictions based on a finding of
improper purpose.'25
2. The Supreme Court'sApplication of the Undue Burden
Standard
As the lower courts struggled to discern the meaning of the Casey
undue burden standard and apply it to a vast array of abortion restrictions, the Supreme Court remained in a kind of holding pattern
in its abortion jurisprudence in the first fifteen years after Casey,
accepting few cases for full review. Since 1992, the Court has applied
the undue burden standard in only four cases that produced full
opinions: Mazurek v. Armstrong,126 Stenberg v. Carhart,2 7 Ayotte v.
Planned Parenthoodof Northern New England,2 ' and Gonzales v.
Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 83, 100 (1989).
121. For a thorough analysis of the implementation of the purpose prong in the lower
federal courts, see Wharton et al., supranote 40, at 377-85.
122. Id. at 377-78.
123. See, e.g., Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177, 1212 (W.D. Wis. 1997) (rejecting the
purpose prong challenge to Wisconsin's mandatory waiting period and biased counseling
provisions because "the Supreme Court reviewed similar provisions in the Pennsylvania
law and did not find that they revealed an impermissible legislative purpose"), affd in
part, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
124. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (per curiam); see infra notes 149-54
and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (10th Cir. 1996) (invalidating
Utah's statute restricting abortions after twenty weeks' gestation where Utah conceded
that the legislature acted with improper motive). See generally Wharton et al., supra
note 40, at 378 n.349 (noting that research revealed only three lower court decisions
invalidating an abortion restriction on the basis of improper purpose).
126. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968.
127. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
128. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
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2 9 As discussed
Carhart.'
below, while Armstrong increased uncertainty about the meaning of Casey's purpose prong, during the years
in which Justice O'Connor remained on the Court, by a slim margin,
the Court otherwise largely reaffirmed the protection announced in
Casey. 30 Importantly, the Court preserved the vital principle - first
enunciated in Roe and steadfastly reaffirmed in Casey and other
decisions - that abortion restrictions must never threaten women's
health. In 2007, however, during the first full term following Justice
O'Connor's retirement from the Court and Justice Alito's succession
to her seat, the Court shifted course in Gonzales v. Carhart,severely
eroding the protection previously available under Roe, Casey, and
their progeny.' 3

a. Stenberg v. Carhart, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of
Northern New England, Mazurek v. Armstrong
In Stenberg v. Carhart,the first post-Casey challenge to be fully
briefed and argued to the Supreme Court, the Court considered the
32
constitutionality of a criminal ban on certain abortion procedures.1
Following Casey, abortion opponents successfully championed criminal
bans on particular abortion procedures, which they labeled "partial
birth abortions," thus gaining passage of these bans throughout the
country.'3 3 In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court struck down
Nebraska's abortion procedure ban,3 in part, because it lacked a
129. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
130. See generally Wharton et al., supra note 40, at 342-52 (discussing the Supreme
Court's post-Casey undue burden jurisprudence). In Lambert v. Wicklund, the Court
sustained a Montana parental notification law, but did so on the ground that it was
"indistinguishable" from the one upheld in Ohio v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health.
Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997) (citing Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health (Akron 11), 497 U.S. 502, 508 (1990)).
131. See Carhart,550 U.S. at 125 (upholding Nebraska's Partial Birth Abortion Ban
on the ground that it did not impose an undue burden on a woman's right to abortion based
on overbreadth or lack of a health exception).
132. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 914.
133. Thirty-one states and the federal government have enacted these bans.
GUIrMACHER INST., STATE POICIES IN BRIEF: BANS ON'TARTIAL BIRTH" ABORTION (2009),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibBPBA.pdf. The enactment of these
abortion procedure bans was part of a long-range strategy of the anti-abortion movement
to reframe the abortion debate: "By identifying the intact procedure and giving it the
provocative label 'partial birth abortion,' the movement turned the public focus of the
abortion debate from the rights of women to the fate of fetuses." Linda Greenhouse, In
Reversal of Course, Justices, 5-4, Back Ban on Abortion Method, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
2007, at Al.
134. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922 (noting that Nebraska's ban applied to pre- and postviability abortions "'in which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing the delivery"'
(quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-328 (Supp. 1999)).
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health exception.'3 5 In doing so, the Stenberg majority reaffirmed
Casey.'3 6 A solid majority of the Court acknowledged that the undue
burden standard, first drafted by a three Justice plurality in Casey,
was the controlling standard.3 7 The Court also reaffirmed the long
standing principle that women's health is of paramount importance
and cannot be compromised by abortion restrictions.' 3 8 As in Casey,
the Court did not require plaintiffs to prove that a large number of
women would be harmed by Nebraska's abortion procedure ban, thus
implicitly rejecting the application of the tough Salernostandard for
facial challenges.' 3 9 Yet, the Stenberg decision also highlighted the
fragility of the three Justice coalition that formed the Casey plurality. 4 ° Although he had been one of the authors of the Casey joint
opinion, Justice Kennedy dissented.' 4' While agreeing that the Casey
standard controlled, he vehemently objected to the majority's failure
to give appropriate deference to the state's interest in regulating
this particular abortion procedure.'
The Stenberg Court viewed the lack of a health exception as per se
unconstitutional and had no trouble facially invalidating Nebraska's
abortion procedure ban.'43 In Ayotte v. PlannedParenthoodof Northern
135. Id. at 930. The Court also found that the Nebraska ban failed to distinguish between two abortion procedures, the rarely used dilation and extraction ('D&)V') procedure
and the more commonly used second-trimester dilation and evacuation ('D&EY) procedure.
Id. at 939. Because the ban effectively applied to both procedures, it posed an undue
burden on women's ability to choose D&E abortions. Id. at 938. Because a criminal ban
on the most common method of second-trimester abortions would entirely foreclose access
to abortion for some women, the Court concluded that the statute had the impermissible
"'effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion."'
Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)).
136. Id. at 930.
137. Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Souter and Ginsburg; Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
dissented. Id. at 920, 952, 956, 980.
138. Id. at 938 ("[Wlhere substantial medical authority supports the proposition that
banning a particular abortion procedure could endanger women's health, Casey requires
the statute to include a health exception when the procedure is "'necessary, in appropriate
(quoting
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.'
Casey, 505 U.S. at 879)).
139. Id. at 933-34; see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
140. The fragility of this coalition was also illustrated by Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in which she emphasized that had Nebraska's law contained a health exception
and had it been limited to D&X abortions, she would have voted to uphold the law. Id.
at 950-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 956 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 956-57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Foreshadowing his opinion in Carhart,
Justice Kennedy emphasized: "States ... have an interest in forbidding medical procedures which ... might cause the medical profession or society as a whole to become
insensitive ... to life .... A State may take measures to ensure the medical profession
and its members are viewed as healers... cognizant of the dignity and value of human
life ... " Id. at 961-62; see infra note 163 and accompanying text.
143. Id. at 937-38.

2009]

ROE AT THIRTY-SIX AND BEYOND

New England, decided six years later, the Court struggled with the
question of the appropriate remedy in a facial challenge to a New
Hampshire parental notification law that lacked an explicit health
exception.' 4 4 Justice O'Connor wrote for a unanimous court that the
statute, as written, would be unconstitutional under existing precedent, thus reaffirming the importance of protecting women's health
and, again, implicitly declining to apply the Salerno standard.'4 5 On
the question of remedy, however, perhaps in response to the concerns expressed by Justice Kennedy about judicial overreaching in
his Stenberg dissent, the Court avoided the issue by remanding to the
lower court to settle the question.'4 6 In her final opinion on the Court,
Justice O'Connor thus avoided conflict within the Court by compromising on the question of remedy while otherwise maintaining the
status quo in its abortion jurisprudence. 4 v
While reaffirming key principles of Casey, these first post-Casey
opinions failed to clarify the type of evidence necessary to establish an
improper legislative purpose for restrictions on access to abortion.' 4 8
In Mazurek v.Armstrong, decided several years before Stenberg,the
Court offered a narrow and somewhat confusing reading of the purpose prong when it sustained a Montana law that restricted the performance of abortions to licensed physicians.' The plaintiffs argued
that the motive for the Montana restriction was to make abortions
more difficult by preventing the sole physician's assistant performing abortions in the state from doing so. ° In a per curiam opinion,
the Court rejected the argument, holding:

144. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 323 (2006).
145. See id. at 327-28.
146. Id. at 323 ("If enforcing a statute that regulates access to abortion would be
unconstitutional in medical emergencies, what is the appropriate judicial response? We
hold that invalidating the statute entirely is not always necessary or justified, for lower
courts may be able to render narrower declaratory and injunctive relief.").
147. See Wharton et al., supra note 40, at 351.
148. While the majority in Stenberg did not reach the question of whether the
Nebraska abortion procedure ban violated the purpose prong, Justice Ginsburg, joined
by Justice Stevens, wrote separately to emphasize the improper motive underlying
Nebraska's abortion procedure ban. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 951-52 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
149. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968,969 (1997) (per curiam). The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in refusing to preliminarily enjoin
the statute. The court found that the plaintiffs had met their burden of demonstrating
"'a fair chance of success"' on their claim that Montana's physician-only law was invalid
because its purpose was to create "a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion."
Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at
878), rev'd, 520 U.S. 968 (1997). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in the same
order, issued a summary ruling deciding the merits of plaintiffs' claims. Armstrong, 520
U.S. at 976.
150. Armstrong, 520 U.S. at 972, 974.
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[E]ven assuming the correctness of the Court ofAppeals' implicit
premise -that a legislativepurpose to interfere with the constitutionally protected right to abortion without the effect of interfering
with that right (here it is uncontested that there was insufficient
evidence of a "substantial obstacle" to abortion) could render the
Montana law invalid - there is no basis for finding a vitiating
legislative purpose here.151
The Court put great weight on the absence of evidence establishing an
adverse impact on women's access to abortion in Montana and the absence of direct evidence of improper motive on the part of Montana's
legislature.15 2 The Court explicitly declined to comment on the lower
court's proposed method for determining improper legislative motive.153 Thus, far from clarifying the meaning of the purpose prong,
the Court injected uncertainty into its application by both refusing to
provide guidance on a proper methodology for determining improper
legislative motive and suggesting that an improper purpose to create
a substantial obstacle can only be inferred if the intended obstruction
is actually created. As noted above, following Armstrong, the lower
courts have been extremely reluctant to invalidate abortion restrictions based upon the purpose prong.'
b. Gonzales v. Carhart
In 2007, in Gonzales v. Carhart,the Supreme Court revisited the
question of whether an abortion procedure ban that lacks a health exception can survive a facial challenge.'5 5 This time the Court came to
the opposite conclusion, upholding the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003.56 The different result was simply a matter of one
vote - Justice Alito had replaced Justice O'Connor, and he supplied
151. Id. at 972 (emphasis in original).
152. See id. at 973-74 (rejecting arguments put forth by plaintiffs to support a finding
of improper purpose).
153. Id. at 974 n.2. Relying on Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) and Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996), a pair of legislative redistricting challenges, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held: "Legislative purpose to accomplish a constitutionally

forbidden result may be found when that purpose was 'the predominant factor motivating
the legislature's decision."' Armstrong, 94 F.3d at 567 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916).
The court of appeals also instructed that courts may find purpose in both "the structure
of the legislation" and the legislative history. Id.
154. See, e.g., Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177, 1210 (W.D. Wis. 1997) ("After
[Armstrong], the impermissible purpose prong of the undue burden test appears almost
impossible to prove. ....
!.
155. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132 (2007).
156. Id. at 132-33. For the text of the statute, see Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2000).
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the fifth vote to uphold the first-ever federal ban on an abortion
method. 157 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy held that the law
and did not impose an undue burden on
was not void for vagueness
15
women seeking abortion.
While insisting that the outcome was compelled by past precedent, 159 in fact, the majority's analysis in Carhartreflects a dramatic
retreat from the core principles of Roe, Casey, and their progeny.
Despite its unanimous holding just one year earlier in Ayotte, and for
the first time since Roe, the Court sustained an abortion restriction
with no exception for safeguarding women's health. 6 ° The Court did
so by failing to apply Stenberg's holding that "where substantial
medical authority supports the proposition that [a statute] banning
a particular abortion procedure could endanger women's health,"
the statute must include an exception to protect women's health.' 6 '
Instead, the Court held that Congress could omit a health exception
because there was some "medical uncertainty" over the need for
one.'6 2 This new, more lenient standard enabled the Court to give
"short shrift" to the trial court's findings that "'the majority of highlyqualified experts on the subject believe intact D&E to be the safest,
most appropriate procedure under certain circumstances. "'163
A palpable hostility to facial challenges pervaded the Court's
analysis. The Court admonished "that these facial attacks should
not have been entertained in the first instance."164 Without distinguishing Stenberg, the Court summarily concluded, with no logical
explanation, that the federal ban was valid on its face because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that it would be unconstitutional "'in a
157. Carhart,550 U.S. at 131.
158. Id. at 168. The Court found that the statute did not pose an undue burden because
of either overbreadth or the absence of a health exception. Id.
159. See id. at 163 ('"The Court's precedents instruct that the Act can survive this
facial attack.").
160. Id. at 164-68.
161. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000) (emphasis added).
162. Carhart,550 U.S. at 164 ("The medical uncertainty over whether the Act's prohibition creates significant health risks provides a sufficient basis to conclude in this facial
attack that the Act does not impose an undue burden.").
163. Id. at 179-80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am.
v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). The Court also failed to look
meaningfully at the Act's purpose. But see id. at 174 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ('The
Act's sponsors left no doubt that their intention was to nullify our ruling in Stenberg.").
For an analysis of the unconstitutional purpose underlying the federal abortion procedure
ban, see Caroline Burnett, Note, DismantlingRoe Brick by Brick - The Unconstitutional
Purpose Behind the FederalPartial-BirthAbortion Act of 2003, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 227,
230-31 (2007).
164. Id. at 167. The Court acknowledged that the applicability of Salerno "has been
a subject of some question," but declined to resolve the debate, purportedly applying
Casey's 'large fraction" standard. Id.
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large fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant."'16 5 The Court
left the door "open to a proper as-applied challenge in a discrete
case,"1"' but as Justice Ginsburg argued, this unsatisfactory option
may "jeopardize[] women's health and place[] doctors in an untenable position" of risking criminal prosecution if they choose the safest
medical procedure for their patients in an emergency situation.16 7
The CarhartCourt also departed from past precedent by explicitly expanding the range of governmental interests that can justify
restrictions on abortion.' 68 Most significantly, embracing a womanprotectionist rationale championed by anti-abortion advocates,6 9 the
Court reasoned that government is justified in protecting women from
choices they might later regret:
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the
bond of love the mother has for her child .... Whether to have an
abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision. While
we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice
to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe
depression and loss of esteem follow.
In a decision so fraught with emotional consequence some
doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details of the means that
will be used [to terminate the pregnancy] ....

165. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 895) (alteration in original). Justice Ginsburg
highlighted the flaws in the majority's reasoning on this point:
It makes no sense to conclude that this facial challenge fails because respondents have not shown that a health exception is necessary for a large
fraction of second-trimester abortions, including those for which a health
exception is unnecessary: The very purpose of a health exception is to protect
women in exceptional cases.
Id. at 188-89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
166. Id. at 168.
167. Id. at 190 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
168. In addition to governmental interests acknowledged in Roe and Casey, the Court
invoked "the government['s] . . . 'interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession."' Id. at 157 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731
(1997)). The Court also emphasized the "ethical and moral concerns" raised by the abortion
method in question. Carhart,550 U.S. at 158. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
571 (2003) ("For many persons [objections to homosexual conduct] are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles ....
[T]he power of the State [may not be used] to enforce these views on the whole society
through operation of the criminal law."); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 850 (1992) ("Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our
own moral code.").
169. For an excellent history of the anti-abortion movement's efforts to cast abortion
restrictions as legislation that protects women, see Siegel, The New Politics,supra note
28, at 1002-29.
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...The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice
is well informed. 7 '

Justice Ginsburg objected vehemently to this reasoning, highlighting
the paternalism and outmoded stereotypes about women's decisionmaking capacity that underlay it:
This way of thinking reflects ancient notions about women's
place in the family and under the Constitution - ideas that have
long since been discredited.
Though today's majority may regard women's feelings on
the matter as "self-evident," this Court has repeatedly confirmed
that "[t]he destiny of the woman must be shaped... on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society."' 1

Finally, the tone and rhetoric of Justice's Kennedy opinion in
Carhart bears little resemblance to the plurality opinion he coauthored in Casey. The opinion merely "assume[s]" the applicability
of Casey,'72 but offers no explicit reaffirmation or positive endorsement of its principles. Moreover, the opinion is filled with anti-abortion
rhetoric, terminology and pejorative labels.'7 3 As Professors Post and
Siegel have written:
170. Carhart,550 U.S. at 159 (citations omitted); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 ("In
attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the
State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an
abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her
decision was not fully informed."). The only support provided by Justice Kennedy in
Carhartfor the proposition that abortion harms women's mental health was an amicus
curiae brief filed by the Justice Foundation, a conservative legal organization. Carhart,
550 U.S. at 159 (citing Brief of Sandra Cano, the Former 'Mary Doe" of Doe v. Bolton,
and 180 Women Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 1436684). But see id. at 183 n.7
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[A]bortion is a painfully difficult decision. But neither the
weight of the scientific evidence to date nor the observable reality of 33 years of legal
abortion in the United States comports with the idea that having an abortion is any more
dangerous to a woman's long-term mental health than delivering and parenting a child
that she did not intend to have. ... .") (citation omitted). Justice Ginsburg's skepticism
about the link between abortion and increased mental health disorders was subsequently validated by a study of the American Psychological Association's Task Force on
Mental Health and Abortion. See REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH

& ABORTION 5-6 (2008), http://www.apa.org/releases/abortion-report.pdf (concluding "that
among adult women who have an unplannedpregnancy the relative risk of mental health
problems is no greater if they have a single elective first-trimester abortion than if they
deliver that pregnancy") (emphasis in original).
171. Carhart,550 U.S. at 185 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 146; see also id. at 156 ("accept[ing] [Casey's principles] as controlling").
173. See, e.g., id. at 134 (describing fetus as "the unborn child"); id. at 159 (describing
fetus as "the infant life"); id. at 154 (referring to obstetrician-gynecologists and surgeons
who perform abortions as "abortion doctors").
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In stark contrast to Casey, which took great pains to signal to both
sides of the controversy that the Court can be trusted to craft a
form of constitutional law that acknowledges their values, Carhart
conspicuously affirms the concerns of antiabortion advocates without signaling similar respect for the concerns of abortion rights
advocates.174
While the import of Carhartbeyond the context of abortion procedure bans remains unclear,175 the decision undoubtedly further
weakens federal constitutional protection for abortion, giving the
176
green light to a vast array of women-protective abortion restrictions
and potentially insulating them from facial challenge even where
the weight of medical opinion counsels that they endanger women's
health.
II.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw CHALLENGES TO ABORTION
RESTRICTIONS

Given the difficulty of mounting successful challenges to abortion restrictions under the Federal Constitution, state constitutional
remedies have the potential to play an increasingly important role
in protecting abortion rights. This section examines the extent to
which state constitutions are fulfilling their potential for enhancing
protection for abortion beyond that currently available under the
Federal Constitution.
A. An Overview of State ConstitutionalGuaranteesof Privacy and
Equality
Although no state constitution currently affirmatively protects a
right to abortion,'77 states offer a vast array of constitutional protection
174. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: DemocraticConstitutionalismand Backlash,
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373, 431 (2007).
175. Some commentators have urged caution in assuming that Carhart'srationale
extends beyond the context of the particular abortion procedure ban before the Court.
See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Op-Ed., Don't Assume the Worst, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 21, 2007,
at A15.
176. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726,
734-35 (8th Cir. 2008) (relying on Carhartin upholding a South Dakota biased counseling
law that forces doctors to give women a written statement that tells them, inter alia,
"[t]hat the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human
being" and that the "known medical risks" of abortion include "depression" and "increased
risk of suicide").
177. To the extent that state constitutions explicitly refer to abortion, they do so in
negative terms. Four state constitutions explicitly limit protection for abortion. See ARK.
CONST. amend. 68, § 2 ('The policy of Arkansas is to protect the life of every unborn child
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for individual rights of liberty and equality that provide fertile ground
for protecting reproductive rights.'78 Privacy rights are protected by
a variety of state guarantees. Ten state constitutions contain explicit
protection for privacy rights.1 79 In other states, courts have found
protection for individual privacy implicit in a variety of other constitutional texts, such as an inalienable8 0and natural rights clause, a preamble, or a due process guarantee.
from conception until birth, to the extent permitted by the Federal Constitution."); id.
§ 1 ("No public funds will be used to pay for any abortion, except to save the mother's
life."); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 50 ("No public funds shall be used by the State of Colorado,
its agencies or political subdivisions to pay or otherwise reimburse, either directly or indirectly, any person, agency or facility for the performance of any induced abortion....');
FLA. CONST. art X, § 22 ('The legislature shall not limit or deny the privacy right guaranteed to a minor under the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court. Notwithstanding a minor's right of privacy provided in Section 23 of
Article I, the Legislature is authorized to require by general law for notification to a parent
or guardian of a minor before the termination of the minor's pregnancy. The Legislature
shall provide exceptions to such requirement for notification and shall create a process
for judicial waiver of the notification."); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2 (stating that due process
and sex equality guarantees "shall [not] be construed to grant or secure any right relating
to abortion or the funding thereof').
178. Although this Article focuses on state privacy and equality guarantees, abortion
restrictions may also run afoul of other state constitutional provisions, including prohibitions against interference with freedom of speech. See Kevin Francis O'Neill, The Road
Not Taken: State Constitutionsas an Alternative Source of Protection for Reproductive
Rights, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 61-76 (1993) (discussing potential free speech and
freedom of conscience challenges to abortion restrictions). See generallyRachael N. Pine
& Sylvia A. Law, Envisioning a Future for Reproductive Liberty: Strategiesfor Making
the Rights Real, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407,431-33 (1992) (discussing a broad variety
of constitutional grounds for protecting reproductive liberty); Post, supra note 29
(analyzing freedom of speech implications of abortion regulations that compel specific
physician speech). Although no state constitutions contain explicit positive protection for
abortion rights, eight states - California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Nevada,
Vermont, and Washington - have enacted broad statutory protection for the abortion
right. Many of these laws essentially codify Roe's core protections. See CTR. FOR REPROD.
RIGHTS, WHAT IF ROE FELL? 118-23 (2007), http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civic
actions.net/files/documents/RoePublicationsPF4a_0.pdf.
179. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 12; LA. CONST. art. I,
§ 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 9-10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. See
generally 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 2.01-02 (4th ed. 2006). In
five of these states, "Alaska, California, Florida, Hawaii, and Montana, privacy is both
expressly enumerated as an individual right, and, as matter of structure, separated from
related protections ....
Id. § 2.02[1]. The remaining states "protect some formulation
of privacy by including it in a section also intended to limit searches and seizures of
persons and property by government officials." Id. Most of these privacy guarantees were
added to state constitutions following the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Court held that the right of married couples to use
contraceptives is a privacy interest protected under the Federal Constitution. Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965); John M. Devlin, State ConstitutionalAutonomy
Rights in an Age of FederalRetrenchment: Some Thoughts on the Interpretationof State
Rights Derivedfrom FederalSources, 3 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 195, 205-13 (1990).
180. FRIESEN, supranote 179, §§ 2.02[2], 2.05[2].
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State constitutions also offer rich protection for equality rights.
Fifteen states have mandatory equal protection clauses much like that
contained in the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment."'
Other state constitutions protect equality interests through "natural
rights declarations, bans on unequal privileges and immunities," or a
variety of other provisions that recognize individual equality. 82 Significantly, unlike the Federal Constitution, many state constitutions also
contain equal rights amendments (ERAs) - provisions that explicitly
protect against sex-based discrimination.8I 3 The texts of these provisions - inspired largely by the Federal Equal Rights Amendment
campaign of the 1970s and early 1980s - vary from state-to-state,
but twenty states have sex equality guarantees that could potentially
be used to strengthen protection for abortion rights."M
B. Abortion Rights Litigation Under State Constitutions
The new judicial federalism has supported the development of
these state guarantees of liberty and equality as independent, broadbased sources of protection.1 8 5Embracing their authority to interpret
state constitutions independent of federal constitutional law, state
court judges in the past several decades have repeatedly "stepped into
the breach to revitalize those rights" in areas in which the Supreme
181. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1,
para. 2; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2; LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; ME. CONST.
art. I, § 6-A; MICH. CoNsT. art. I, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 18; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2;
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3.
182. FRIESEN, supra note 179, § 3.01[2].
183. For a thorough analysis of the judicial application of state equal rights amendments
in a variety of contexts, see Linda J. Wharton, State EqualRights Amendments Revisited:
Evaluating Their Effectiveness in Advancing ProtectionAgainst Sex Discrimination,36
RUTGERS L.J. 1201 (2005).
184. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20;
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18; IOWA CONST. art. I,
§ 1; LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; MD. CONST., Decl. Of Rts., art. 46; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. I;
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; N.H. CONST. art. 2; N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1 & art. X, para.
4; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; PA. CONST. art. I, § 28 ; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a; UTAH CONST.
art. IV, § 1; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 2.
Florida, however, has placed specific limits on protection for abortion rights under its
constitution and Rhode Island explicitly excludes abortion from protection under its ERA.
See supra note 177. In addition, as discussed infra, in two states - New Mexico and
Texas - state supreme courts have rejected efforts to protect abortion rights under their
state ERAs in the context of challenges to restrictions on public funding of medically
necessary abortions. See infra notes 219, 234-238 and accompanying text.
185. See generally SHAMAN, supra note 32; G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE
CONSTITUTIONS (1998); Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing of State ConstitutionJurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421 (1996); Robert F. Williams, Foreword:Looking Back at
the New JudicialFederalism'sFirst Generation,30 VAL. U. L. REV. xiii (1996).
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Court's own commitment to liberty and equality fell short. 8 ' In the
area of reproductive rights, state law challenges to restrictions on
public funding for abortion and restrictions on young women's access
to abortion have enjoyed considerable success. Following Casey, litigators also invoked the principles of independent state constitutional
interpretation in urging state courts to assess waiting periods, biased
counseling provisions, and other restrictions based on more exacting
Roe-like standards and to forego application of the less protective,
undue burden standard. 8 ' While the results in these cases have

been mixed, here too some state courts have been willing to extend
greater protection to abortion rights than that available under Casey
and its progeny.
1. ExpandingPublic Fundingfor Abortions
Shortly after the Supreme Court's decisions in Harrisv. McRae
and Maher v. Roe, reproductive rights litigators turned to state courts
for expanded protection. In a series of cases beginning in the early
1980s, litigators brought state constitutional law challenges to state
laws that severely restricted public funding for medically necessary
abortions while fully funding childbirth. Although some courts have
upheld these laws,"M challenges to abortion funding restrictions have
frequently been successful. Relying on either privacy or equality guarantees, the majority of courts, including eight courts of last resort,
have interpreted their state constitutions to provide greater protection
186. SHAMAN, supra note 32, at xvii.
187. For commentary, written shortly after Casey, on the potential for state constitutions to provide greater protection for abortion rights, see Catherine Albisa, The Last
Line of Defense: The Tennessee Constitutionand the Right to Privacy, 25 U. MEM. L. REV.
3 (1994); Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v.
Casey: EstablishingNeutrality Principlesin State ConstitutionalLaw, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
1151 (1993); O'Neill, supra note 178.
188. Renee B. v. Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., 790 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Fla.
2001); A Choice for Women, Inc. v. Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., 872 So. 2d 970,
973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam); Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Kurtz,
No. CVOC0103909D, 2002 WL 32156983, at *4 (Idaho Dist. Ct. June 12, 2002); Doe v.
Childers, No. 94CI02183, slip op. at 13 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Aug. 3, 1995); Doe v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 487 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Mich. 1992); Rosie J. v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 491
S.E.2d 535, 538 (N.C. 1997); Fischer v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114, 126 (Pa. 1985);
Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex., 95 S.W.3d 253, 266 (Tex. 2002); see also Humphreys
v. Clinic for Women, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 247, 259-60 (Ind. 2003) (holding that the Indiana
Constitution requires public funding for abortion only where "pregnancies create [a]
serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function"); cf.
Hope v. Perales, 634 N.E.2d 183, 184 (N.Y. 1994) (holding that a public funding program
that pays for medically necessary abortions for women eligible for its Medicaid program,
but not for women with higher incomes who can afford abortions, does not violate New
York Constitution).
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18 9
for full public funding of abortion than the Federal Constitution.
These decisions invalidated limitations on public funding of abortion
in thirteen states.1 9 The opinions highlighted below illustrate the
varying analytical and theoretical approaches courts have taken in
these cases.
Some courts have held that the differential treatment of women
who need medical care to continue their pregnancies and women for

189. Alaska Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 28
P.3d 904, 908 (Alaska 2001) (invalidating Alaska's restrictions on public funding of medically necessary abortions based on "the state constitutional guarantee of 'equal rights,
opportunities and protection under the law"' (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. I, §1)); Simat
Corp. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 56 P.3d 28, 32, 37 (Ariz. 2002)
(invalidating Arizona's restrictions on public funding of medically necessary abortions
based on the state constitution's equal privileges and immunities clause); Comm. to Defend
Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 798-99 (Cal. 1981) (invalidating California's
restrictions on public funding of medically necessary abortions based on state constitutional
guarantee of privacy); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 162 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (invalidating Connecticut's restrictions on public funding of medically necessary abortions
based on state ERA, equal protection and due process clauses); Doe v. Wright, No. 91 CH
1958, slip op. (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 2, 1994) (granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
because the statutes at issue violate the Illinois Constitution to the extent that they deny
reimbursement for an abortion necessary to protect a woman's health); Moe v. Sec'y of
Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 390 n.4, 397 (Mass. 1981) (invalidating Massachusetts's
restrictions on public funding of medically necessary abortions based on protection for
privacy under the state's Declaration of Rights, which guarantees due process of the law);
Women of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 31-32 (Minn. 1995) (invalidating Minnesota's
restrictions on public funding of medically necessary abortions based on state constitutional
guarantees of privacy); Jeannette R. v. Ellery, No. BDV-94-811, 1995 Mont. Dist. LEXIS
795, at * 21-28 (Mont. Dist. Ct. May 22, 1995) (invalidating Montana's restrictions on
public funding of medically necessary abortions based on state constitutional guarantees
of privacy and equal protection); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 941 (N.J. 1982)
(invalidating New Jersey's restrictions on public funding of medically necessary abortions
based on state constitutional guarantee of equal protection); N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL
v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, 61, 975 P.2d 841,859 (invalidating New Mexico's restrictions on public funding of medically necessary abortions based on state ERA); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Dep't of Human Res. of Or., 663 P.2d 1247, 1258-61 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)
(invalidating Oregon's restrictions on public funding of medically necessary abortions
based on state privileges and immunities clause), affd en banc on statutorygrounds,687
P.2d 785 (Or. 1984); Doe v. Celani, No. S81-84CnC, slip op. at 8-12 (Vt. Super. Ct. May 23,
1986) (holding regulation that denies reimbursement for medically necessary abortions
unconstitutional under the Vermont Constitution); Women's Health Ctr. of W. Va., Inc. v.
Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658, 663-67 (W. Va. 1993) (invalidating West Virginia's restrictions
on public funding of medically necessary abortions based on state constitutional guarantee
of "safety" and common benefit and due process clauses); see also Feminist Women's
Health Ctr. v. Burgess, 651 S.E.2d 36, 39 (Ga. 2007) (holding that abortion providers have
standing to challenge Georgia's restrictions on public funding of medically necessary
abortions).
190. Currently, seventeen states use state Medicaid funds to provide all or most
medically necessary abortions. Four states provide funding voluntarily; thirteen do so
pursuant to court order. GuTCMACHER INST., STATE POLIcIEs IN BRIEF: STATE FUNDING OF
ABORTION UNDER MEDICAID (2009), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib
_SFAM.pdf. Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia follow the Federal Medicaid
standard and provide state funding for abortion only in cases of life endangerment, rape
or incest. Id.

20091

ROE AT THIRTY-SIX AND BEYOND

503

whom abortion is medically necessary impermissibly interferes with
constitutionally protected privacy guarantees. In Women of Minnesota
v. Gomez, for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court invalidated
Minnesota's restrictions on public funding of medically necessary
abortions based on its state constitution's privacy guarantees, which
the court found encompassed the abortion right. 191 Most significantly,
in defining the scope of the abortion right, the court rejected the narrow reasoning of McRae, in which the Supreme Court found no impermissible interference with the abortion right where "government
action.., simply fails to remove a preexisting barrier."'9 2 Opting to
interpret its constitution "to offer greater protection.., than [that]
afforded under the federal constitution,"' 9 3 the Minnesota court reasoned that the fundamental right to an abortion requires government
neutrality not only when government acts to control abortion directly,
but also when it seeks to influence reproductive choice through more
indirect legislative action."9 Through its discriminatory distribution
of government benefits, Minnesota had sought to influence reproductive choices and thereby impermissibly infringed on the fundamental
right of privacy:
[TI]he right of privacy under our constitution protects not simply
the right to an abortion, but rather it protects the woman's decision
to abort; any legislation infringing on the decision-making process,
then, violates this fundamental right. In the present case, the
infringement is the state's offer of money to women for health
care services necessary to carry the pregnancy to term, and the
state's ban on health care funding for women who choose therapeutic abortions .... We simply cannot say that an indigent
woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy is not sigmedical
nificantly impacted by the state's offer of comprehensive
1 95
services if the woman carries the pregnancy to term.
Having concluded that Minnesota's funding restriction infringed on
a fundamental right of privacy, the court reviewed the law under
the strict scrutiny standard.19 6 The court found that the state's interest in protecting potential life - the sole justification proffered by
191. Women of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 26-27, 31-32 (Minn. 1995).
192. Id. at 28; see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
193. Women, 542 N.W.2d at 30-31.
194. Id. at 31.
195. Id.
196. Id. Although decided after the Supreme Court's decision in Casey, the Minnesota
court adhered to (and specifically cited) Roe's holding that the state's interest in potential
life does not become compelling until the point of viability. Id. at 31-32.
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Minnesota- could not justify governmental intrusion into a woman's
197
decision whether to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability.
In departing from McRae, the Minnesota court emphasized its
independent responsibility to safeguard Minnesota citizens and justified its broad protection of individual liberty as consistent with
Minnesota's historical traditions and precedent. 9 ' Specifically, the
court invoked Minnesota's "long tradition of affording persons on the
periphery of society a greater measure of government protection and
support than.., available elsewhere"" and prior decisions in which
it had "expand[ed] the protective reach of the Minnesota Constitution
beyond that of the U.S. Constitution."20 0
Women of Minnesota is consistent with the approach of other
courts that have rejected funding limitations on privacy grounds.
These courts consistently undertake an independent analysis in applying their state constitutions to the case before them. In Committee
to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, for example, the California
Supreme Court emphasized its "solemn and independent constitutional obligation to interpret the safeguards guaranteed by the
California Constitution in a manner consistent with the governing
principles of California law."20 ' The court explained:
"[J]ust as the United States Supreme Court bears the ultimate
judicial responsibility for determining matters of federal law,
this court bears the ultimate judicial responsibility for resolving
questions of state law, including the proper interpretation ofprovisions of the state Constitution. In fulfilling this difficult and
grave responsibility, we cannot properly relegate our task to the
judicial guardians of the federal Constitution, but instead must
recognize our personal obligation to exercise independent legal
judgment in ascertaining the meaning and application of state
constitutional provisions."" 2
In rejecting McRae and concluding "that each woman in this state rich or poor - is guaranteed the constitutional right to make [the
abortion] decision as an individual,uncoerced by governmental intrusion,"203 the court looked to the language of California's Constitution,
197. Id. at 31-32. The court acknowledged that although the state has an interest in
potential life, it does not become compelling until the point of viability. Id.
198. Id. at 30-31.
199. Id. at 30.
200. Id.
201. Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 784 (Cal. 1981) (emphasis

in original).
202. Id. (quoting People v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)).
203. Id. at 798 (emphasis in original).
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which explicitly protects the right of privacy, 2°4 as well as a long line
25
of precedent, including its historic 1969 decision in People v. Belous,
as indicative of the state's strong commitment to autonomy in private
decision making.
As in Women of Minnesotaand Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights, the principle of governmental neutrality infuses other courts'
application of state privacy guarantees. In Doe v. Maher,' 6 for example, a Connecticut court flatly rejected the argument - drawn from
McRae-that Connecticut's differential treatment of pregnant women
carrying to term and those choosing abortion did not constitute impermissible government interference with the abortion right: "'Freedoms
such as these are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal
attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference."' 2 7 Likewise, in Moe v. Secretary of Administration &
Finance,20 1 the Massachusetts Supreme Court invalidated its limitations on public funding of medically necessary abortions, emphasizing
the requirement that the state act even-handedly when distributing
benefits associated with reproductive choice:
As an initial matter, the Legislature need not subsidize any of the
costs associated with child bearing, or with health care generally.
However, once it chooses to enter the constitutionally protected
area of choice, it must do so with genuine indifference. It may not
weigh the options open to the pregnant woman by its allocation
of public funds; in this area, government is not free to "achieve
with carrots what [it] is forbidden to achieve with sticks."2
Significantly, in assessing the impact of their funding schemes,
these courts undertook a highly contextualized analysis that focused
on the realities of affected women's lives and the cumulative burden
of laws that limit options and exacerbate existing hardships. In
Maher, for example, the court emphasized that "infringement must
be measured in the light of .... the 'practical considerations' of the
person the regulation affects"2 1 0 and gave thoughtful consideration
to the impact on poor women of Connecticut's failure to act evenhandedly in distributing health benefits.
204. Id. (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1).
205. Id. at 784, 790 n.2, 792, 796 (citing People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969));
see also Belous, 458 P.2d at 199-200; supra note 35.
206. Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 151-52 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
207. Id. at 151-52.
208. Moe v. Sec'y ofAdmin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981).
209. Id. at 402 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 933 n.77

(1978)) (alteration in original).
210. Maher, 515 A.2d at 153; see also Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 401 ("We are not free to
disregard the practical realities.").

506

WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 15:469

The state has placed her in a trap. The cash welfare allowance
(AFDC) the state grants is barely sufficient to maintain an adequate level of living for her and her family. Her benefits from the
state are substantially under the poverty levels, and the cash
allotment is hardly enough to cover food, shelter and clothing.
Through an intricate network of statutes, she is not allowed to
receive funds from other sources without those funds being deducted from her welfare cash allowance the following month....
And if she should fail to report the receipt of other income and
assets, she could become disqualified for future benefits and subject to criminal charges. Because payments are made directly to
the provider and no cash allowance is given for medical assistance, she is not even given the choice of being able to forego other
medical necessities in favor of the abortion. In short, the state
has boxed her into accepting the pregnancy and carrying the fetus
to term, notwithstanding the sometimes substantial impairment
to her health.2 '
The court went on to carefully catalog the multiple fact situations
in which Connecticut's denial of medically necessary abortions posed
grave consequences for women's physical and mental health.2 12
Other courts have held that the differential treatment of two
classes of poor, pregnant women violates state equal protection
guarantees. These decisions, much like those relying on privacy
guarantees, are noteworthy for their independent approach to state
constitutional interpretation, their insistence on government neutrality toward abortion, their exacting scrutiny of the government's
justifications, and their emphasis on the primacy of women's health.
21 3
In Simat Corp. v. Arizona Health Care Cost ContainmentSystem
and Departmentof Health & Social Services v. PlannedParenthood
of Alaska,214 for example, two post-Casey decisions, the high courts
of Arizona and Alaska held that their state constitutions protect the
right to nondiscriminatory treatment more robustly than does the
Federal Constitution. Because their states' funding restrictions selectively denied a benefit to women exercising a fundamental right, both
courts held that the restrictions could only be upheld if they were necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest. 2 5 Importantly,
211. Id. at 153-54 (footnotes omitted).
212. Id. at 154-55.
213. Simat Corp. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 56 P.3d 28, 31-32 (Ariz.
2002).
214. Dept. of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 28 P.3d 904, 910
(Alaska 2001).
215. Simat, 56 P.3d at 32-33; PlannedParenthoodof Alaska, 28 P.3d at 909-10. Other
courts have used a balancing test to determine whether restrictions on funding medically
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in scrutinizing the justifications offered by Arizona and Alaska for
denying funding to medically necessary abortions, both courts held
that no state interest can "'outweigh the superior interest in the life
and health of the mother." 2 16 Because the discriminatory funding
restrictions gave "priority to potential life at the expense of maternal
health,"2 17 they could not be sustained under either state's equal
protection guarantees.
Courts have been more divided on whether restrictions on public
funding for medically necessary abortions violate state ERAs, but on
two occasions courts have found that funding restrictions impermissibly discriminate on the basis of sex.218 Most recently, in New Mexico
Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson,the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that New Mexico's restrictions on state funding for medically
necessary abortions violated its state ERA.219 Explicitly declining to
follow federal equal protection precedent,2 2 ° the court reasoned that
necessary abortions run afoul of state equal protection provisions. See, e.g., Right to Choose
v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 937 (N.J. 1982) ("In balancing the protection of a woman's health
and her fundamental right to privacy against the asserted state interest in protecting
potential life, we conclude that the governmental interference is unreasonable.'); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Dep't of Human Res. of Or., 663 P.2d 1247, 1260 (Or. App. 1983)
("We conclude that the state's interest in protecting potential human life before viability
of the fetus, by means of the challenged rule, is of a limited nature and is not sufficient
to outweigh the woman's interest in her health.").
216. Simat, 56 P.3d at 35 (quoting Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 935).
217. Id.; see Planned Parenthoodof Alaska, 28 P.3d at 913 ("[A]lthough the State has
a legitimate interest in protecting a fetus, at no point does that interest outweigh the
State's interest in the life and health of the pregnant woman."); id.(citing Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
218. Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 162 (Conn. 1986); N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v.
61, 975 P.2d 841, 859; cf. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n v.
Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005,
Travelers Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 1358, 1359 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (excluding the costs of
normal pregnancy care from an otherwise comprehensive insurance policy constitutes
sex discrimination in violation of the Colorado ERA). But see A Choice for Women, Inc.
v. Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., 872 So. 2d 970, 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(Florida restrictions on funding for medically necessary abortions do not violate Florida's
ERA); Fischer v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114, 126 (Pa. 1985) (Pennsylvania restrictions on funding for medically necessary abortions do not violate Pennsylvania's ERA);
Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex., 95 S.W.3d 253, 266 (Tex. 2002) (Texas restrictions
on funding medically necessary abortions do not violate Texas's ERA).
219. New Mexico Right to Choose, 1999-NMSC-005, 61, 975 P.2d at 859.
220. The New Mexico Supreme Court explicitly declined to follow Geduldig v Aiello,
417 U.S. 484,497 (1975), in which the Supreme Court held that the exclusion of pregnancyrelated disabilities from a state disability insurance program did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. See New Mexico Right to Choose, 1999-NMSC-005, 39, 975 P.2d at
854. The GeduldigCourt reasoned that because "pregnancy is an objectively identifiable
physical condition with unique characteristics," not every classification concerning pregnancy constitutes invidious sex-based discrimination. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. Thus, "[a]bsent
a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an
invidious discrimination," lawmakers were "free" to "exclude pregnancy from coverage"
under the insurance program "on any reasonable basis." Id.
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distinctions based on pregnancy may constitute a form of sex-based
discrimination subject to strict scrutiny review,"' where they operate
to disadvantage women: "'The question at hand is whether government has the power to turn th[e] capacity [to bear children], limited
as it is to one gender, into a source of social disadvantage."' 222 The
court then analyzed New Mexico's funding restriction by considering
it in the larger historical context of laws that disadvantaged women
because of their sex. 223 The court emphasized that New Mexico's
restriction was part and parcel of a long history in which "'women's
biology and ability to bear children have been used as a basis for discrimination against them.' 22 4 The court cited examples, drawn from
case law precedent, of lawmakers' similar past efforts to justify such
"discrimination on the grounds that it is 'benign' or 'protective' of
women."22 5 The court emphasized that the funding scheme jeopardized women's health, highlighting that the record in the trial court
established the "profound [potential] health consequences" of pregnancy. 6 The law also discriminated against women by singling them
out for "less favorable" treatment than men with respect to medically
necessary health services: "[T]here is no comparable restriction on
medically necessary services relating to physical characteristics or conditions that are unique to men. Indeed, we can find no provision...
that disfavors any comparable, medically necessary procedure unique
to the male anatomy." 22 7 Applying the strict scrutiny standard of
review, the court found that New Mexico had produced no compelling justification for its discriminatory treatment of women seeking
medically necessary abortions.2 28
The New Mexico Right to Choose decision is noteworthy for its
thorough and careful analysis of whether divergence from federal
precedent was appropriate in light of distinct characteristics of New
Mexico law.229 The New Mexico Supreme Court examined both the
221. The court also explicitly rejected the less stringent, intermediate standard of review
that the Supreme Court has applied to sex-based classifications. New Mexico Right to
Choose, 1999-NMSC-005, 36, 975 P.2d at 853.
222. Id. 40,975 P.2d at 854 (quoting Sunstein, supranote 28) (alteration in original).
223. Id.
41, 975 P.2d at 854.
224. Id. (quoting Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 159 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1986)).
225. Id.
226. Id.
42, 975 P.2d at 855.
227. Id. 7 46, 975 P.2d at 856.
228. Id. 7 49, 975 P.2d at 856. The court rejected the state's argument that the funding
restriction was justified as a cost-saving measure because the costs of carrying a
pregnancy to term (covered under New Mexico's Medicaid program) are typically much
greater than the cost of abortion. Id. The court also found that the state's interest in
protecting potential life did not justify a funding limitation that jeopardized women's
health. Id. 7 53, 975 P.2d at 857.
229. Id. 77 29-35, 975 P.2d at 851-53.
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text of the New Mexico ERA and its history and meaning in the context of protection from sex discrimination under New Mexico law from
territorial times to the present. 230 The court noted that the ERA was
passed in 1973 "by an overwhelming margin" and represented a "culmination of a series of state constitutional amendments that reflect an
evolving concept of gender equality. 23 1 Based on the distinctive text
and legislative history of the New Mexico ERA, the court found that
the ERA was added to the New Mexico Constitution with the specific
intention of providing broader protection against sex discrimination
than that afforded under the Federal Constitution.2 32 Thus, the court
concluded that "the federal equal protection analysis [was] inapposite
with respect to [the] claim of gender discrimination."2 3 3
In contrast to the independent approach of the courts that have
rejected limitations on the funding of medically necessary abortions,
those courts that have sustained such limitations rely heavily on federal precedent. Recent decisions from the Texas and Florida Supreme
Courts illustrate this approach. In Bell v. Low-Income Women of
Texas, the Texas Supreme Court held that Texas's failure to fund
medically necessary abortions did not violate the Texas ERA.2 34
While noting that the Texas ERA "was 'designed expressly to provide protection which supplements the federal guarantees of equal
treatment,"' and insisting that federal precedent was therefore not
controlling, the Texas court went on to rely heavily - indeed almost
exclusively - on it. 235 Accordingly, unlike the New Mexico Supreme
Court in New Mexico Right to Choose, the Texas Supreme Court refused to find that the state's decision to single out abortion for different treatment amounted to sex discrimination:
[1]t is true that the funding restrictions affect only women, but that
is because only women can become pregnant. If the State were to
deny funding of all medically necessary pregnancy-related services,
the classification might be comparable to [an] overt gender-based
distinction ....
The classification here is not so much directed at
230. Id.
231. Id.

29-31,975 P.2d at 851-52; see Doe v. Maher, 515A.2d 134, 160 (Conn. Super.

Ct. 1986) ("[Bly adopting the ERA, Connecticut determined that the state should no
longer be permitted to disadvantage women because of their sex including their repro-

ductive capabilities.").
232. New Mexico Right to Choose, 1999-NMSC-005,
29-37, 975 P.2d at 851-54; see
Maher, 515 A.2d at 160-61 ("To equate our ERA with the equal protection clause of the
federal constitution would negate its meaning given that our state adopted an ERA while
the federal government failed to do so.").
233. New Mexico Right to Choose, 28, 975 P.2d at 851.
234. Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex., 95 S.W.3d 253, 266 (Tex. 2002).
235. Id. at 257 (quoting TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 14 PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS ANALYZED FOR ELECTION 24 (1972)).
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women as a class as it is abortion as a medical treatment, which,
because it involves potential life, has no parallel as a treatment
method.23 6
Instead, relying on federal equal protection precedent, the court required proof that the funding restriction was based on an invidious
discriminatory purpose.23 7 Because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
a purpose to discriminate because of sex, the court refused to apply
heightened scrutiny and reviewed the funding restriction only to
determine whether it was rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.2 3 Similarly, in Renee B. v. FloridaAgency for Health Care
Administration,the Florida Supreme Court failed to undertake an
analysis that was truly independent of federal law when it sustained
Florida's restrictions on funding medically necessary abortions.2 3 9
That court had previously invalidated restrictions on young women's
access to abortion based on Florida's explicit constitutional protection
of privacy, extending broader protection for privacy than that afforded
by the Federal Constitution.2 4 ° Yet, in Renee B., decided twelve years
later, the court gave short shrift to this important past precedent and
reflexively applied the rationale of McRae.24 '
2. Protectingthe Rights of Young Women
A majority of states restrict young women's access to abortion by
requiring parental involvement in their decision to have an abortion.2 42
236. Low Income Women of Texas, 95 S.W.3d at 258; id. at 262-63 (citing Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) and Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506
U.S. 263, 273 (1993)); see also Fischer v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114, 125 (Pa.
1985) ('The mere fact that only women are affected by this statute does not necessarily
[The
mean that women are being discriminated against on the basis of sex ....
Pennsylvania ERA] 'does not prohibit differential treatment among the sexes when, as
here that treatment is reasonably and genuinely based on physical characteristics
unique to one sex."').
237. Low Income Women of Texas, 95 S.W.3d at 258-60 (citing, inter alia, Pers. Adm'r
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) and Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
238. Id. at 264.
239. Renee B. v. Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., 790 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 2001).
240. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1196 (Fla. 1989); see infra notes 273-77 and accompanying text.
241. Renee B., 790 So. 2d at 1040 (distinguishing T. W. on the ground that a governmental decision not to fund abortion is not the same as "government affirmatively
impos[ing] some barrier or obstacle between a woman and her physician in terms of
making a decision as to whether to have an abortion"); see also N. Fla. Women's Health
& Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 615 (Fla. 2003) (reaffirming T.W. and
invalidating Florida's parental notification law).
242. Thirty-four "states require some parental involvement in a[n] [unemancipated]
minor's decision to have an abortion." GUrTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF:
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Under Bellotti v. Baird24 3 and subsequent Supreme Court decisions,
these laws pass muster under the Federal Constitution so long as
they provide an alternative judicial bypass mechanism. 2 4 In contrast, state privacy and equality guarantees have protected young
women's access to abortion by extending far broader protection than
that available under federal law. Although parental involvement laws
have not been challenged on state constitutional law grounds often,
the success rate in such challenges has been high. Indeed, most of the
state courts that have evaluated parental involvement mandates
under their state constitutions have invalidated them and, in doing
so, have explicitly rejected the judicial bypass procedure as an adequate safeguard for young women's rights.2 45
PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN MINORS' ABORTIONS (2009), http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/spibs/spib PIMA.pdf. Twenty-two of these states require parental consent;
ten states require parental notification. Id. Parental consent laws require young women
to obtain the consent, usually written, of at least one parent before the abortion. Id.
Parental notification laws require a pregnant minor to notify at least one parent of her
intention to undergo an abortion before the procedure, but do not require the parent to
consent. All states include a judicial bypass procedure, which allows a young woman to
obtain approval from a court. Id. Several states allow grandparents or other adults to be
involved in place of the young woman's parents. Id.
243. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
244. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
245. See State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska (PlannedParenthood of Alaska 11),
171 P.3d 577, 585 (Alaska 2007) (invalidating parental consent law under state privacy
guarantee); State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska (PlannedParenthoodofAlaska 1), 35
P.3d 30, 32 (Alaska 2001) (holding that parental consent law is constitutional only if it
can survive strict scrutiny and remanding to lower court for further fact finding); Am.
Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797,800 (Cal. 1997) (invalidating parental consent
law under state privacy guarantee); N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc.
v. Florida, 866 So. 2d 612, 615 (Fla. 2003) (invalidating parental notification law under
state privacy guarantee); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1196 (Fla. 1989) (invalidating
parental consent law under state privacy guarantee); Wicklund v. State, No. ADV 97-671,
1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1116, *23 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Feb. 11, 1999) (granting summary
judgment and invalidating parental consent law under state equal protection guarantee);
Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 621 (N.J. 2000) (invalidating
parental notification law under equal protection guarantee); see also Planned Parenthood
League of Mass., Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 677 N.E.2d 101, 109 (Mass. 1997) (sustaining
parental consent law, but invalidating provision requiring consent of both parents under
due process and equal protection provisions); State v. Koome, 530 P.2d 260, 263 (Wash.
1975) (en banc) (invalidating parental consent requirement under both federal and state
privacy and equal protection guarantees). But see Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 95-CA73-75) (Miss. 1998) (sustaining parental consent law under state con00960-SCT (
stitution); NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, WHO DECIDES? THE STATUS OF WOMEN'S
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: MICHIGAN (2009), http://www.prochoice
america.orglchoice-action--center/in-your-state/who-decidesstate-profilesmichigan.htm
?templateName=lawdetails&issuelD=6&ssumlD=2652 (discussing Planned Parenthood
of Mid-Mich., Inc. v. Attorney Gen., No. D 91-0571 AZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 29, 1994)
(sustaining parental consent law under state constitution)); but see also In re Doe, 407
So. 2d 1190, 1190 (La. 1981) (per curiam) (sustaining parental consent law, but not clarifying constitutional grounds).
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The state supreme courts of Alaska, California, and Florida have
relied on explicit privacy guarantees as the basis for invalidating
parental involvement laws. In American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, the California Supreme Court wrote a particularly strong
opinion rejecting California's one-parent consent law.246 The court
first addressed the state's contention that it should adhere to federal
decisions that had sustained laws similar to California's.24 7 In refusing to do so, the court emphasized the independent status of the
California Constitution, noting "that the rights embodied in and
protected by the state Constitution are not invariably identical to
the rights contained in the federal Constitution."2 4 The text of the
California Constitution, which explicitly protects the right of privacy, revealed a voter intention to provide strong protection for the
right.24 9 Moreover, the court's past decisions, including Committee
to Defend Reproductive Rights,25 ° established that "the scope and
application of the state constitutional right of privacy is broader and
more protective of privacy than the federal constitutional right of
privacy as interpreted by the federal courts."2 '
The court next applied a three-prong test to determine whether
plaintiffs had met their threshold burden of establishing their privacy claim.2 52 First, the court found that the parental consent law
implicated a legally protected privacy interest. 253 In doing so, the
court rejected the state's argument that because the law only applied
to pregnant minors, it should not be viewed as intruding on a protected privacy interest.2 54 The court noted that California's privacy
guarantee applies to "'[a]l people,"'2 5 and that the ballot pamphlet
that accompanied the measure specified that the privacy right would
extend to "'every Californian,' including 'every man, woman and
child in this state." 2 56 The court also cited a long line of California
decisions that had extended privacy protection to minors as well as
adults.25 7 Next, the court found that minors have a "'reasonable
246. American Academy of Pediatrics,940 P.2d 797.
247. Id. at 807-08.
248. Id. at 808.
249. Id.
250. See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
251. American Academy of Pediatrics,940 P.2d at 808.
252. Id. at 812. A plaintiff must establish: "'(1) a legally protected privacy interest;
(2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant
constituting a serious invasion of privacy."' Id. at 811.
253. Id. at 814.
254. Id.
255. Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1) (alteration and emphasis in original).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 814. The court recognized that, as a general matter, parents have the
authority "to exercise a child's privacy right on the child's behalf." Id. at 815. The court
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expectation of privacy"' in the abortion context." 8 The court reasoned
that although there is a general statutory rule that parents must
consent to medical procedures for their children, it "would defeat the
voters' fundamental purpose in establishing a constitutional right
of privacy" if previous practices or general statutory schemes could
override constitutional protection.25 9 Lastly, the court determined that
the parental consent mandate "significantly intrudes" upon young
women's privacy interests.2 " In particular, the court emphasized that
the requirement would likely delay minors' access to a medically safe
procedure, thereby increasing the health risks posed by abortion.2"'
Moreover, a young woman who feared informing a parent might
"attempt to terminate the pregnancy herself or seek a 'back-alley
abortion"' or "to postpone action until it is too late to terminate her
pregnancy, leaving her no choice but to bear an unwanted child."2 2
The court then determined that because the law impinged upon
a fundamental privacy interest, California precedent required the
application of the strict scrutiny standard. 8 The court rejected the
state's argument that in a facial challenge it need only demonstrate
that "the statute constitutionally may be applied in even a single
circumstance covered by the statute."6 4 The court relied on both
California and federal precedent in declining to adopt this restrictive
approach to facial challenges.6 5 Instead, the court held "that when
a statute broadly and directly impinges upon the... rights of a substantial portion of those persons to whom the statute applies," the
state must demonstrate that "the compelling justifications for the
statute outweigh the statute's impingement on constitutional privacy
rights and cannot be achieved by less intrusive means.""6
The court agreed that the state's asserted interests in protecting
the physical, emotional and psychological health of minors and preserving parent-child relationships constituted compelling interests. 7
distinguished the abortion decision from other decisions, however, emphasizing that it
"has ... a substantial effect on a pregnant minor's control over her personal bodily
integrity, has... serious long-term consequences in determining her life choices.... and
(unlike many other choices) is a decision that cannot be postponed until adulthood." Id.
at 816 (emphasis in original).
258. Id. at 817.
259. Id. (emphasis in original).
260. Id. at 817-18.
261. Id. at 817.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 818-19.
264. Id. at 819-20.
265. Id. at 819-23; see also State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska (Alaska1), 35 P.3d
30, 34-35 (Alaska 2001) (rejecting application of "Salerno's 'no set of circumstances"'
standard in a facial challenge to Alaska's parental consent law).
266. American Academy of Pediatrics,940 P.2d at 823.
267. Id.
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The court concluded, however, that the state had failed to show that
the parental consent requirement was necessary to further those
interests.26 The court reasoned that the state's contention that the
statute was necessary to protect young women's health was undermined by the existence of a variety of other California statutes that
"authorize[] a minor, without parental consent, to obtain medical
care and make other important decisions in analogous contexts that
pose.., equal or greater risks" to a young woman's health than those
posed by the decision to terminate a pregnancy.2 6 9 The court also cited
evidence amassed at trial that "overwhelmingly indicated that [the
parental consent law] would not serve - but rather would impede the state's interests in protecting the health of minors and enhancing
the parent-child relationship."27 0 Finally, parting paths with federal
precedent, the court found that the judicial bypass procedure was not
sufficient to save the consent statute because evidence at trial demonstrated that resort to the judicial procedure would delay a young
woman's access to abortion, thereby increasing the medical risks
posed by the abortion procedure.'
In addition to California precedent, the American Academy of
Pediatricscourt also relied heavily on the Florida Supreme Court's
1989 decision in a nearly identical case.2 72 In that decision, In re
268. Id. at 827-28.
269. Id. at 826. The court noted that California law authorizes a minor, without
parental consent, to continue a pregnancy and give birth to a child and to decide whether
to give a child up for adoption. Id. at 826-27. The court also emphasized that "over the
past 30 years the Legislature has enacted a series of statutes authorizing minors,
without parental consent, to obtain medical care related to the diagnosis or treatment
of sexually transmitteddiseases, rape, and sexual assault." Id. at 827 (citations omitted).
270. Id. at 828-29. In particular, the court highlighted trial testimony that established
that most pregnant minors voluntarily consult with their parents before obtaining an
abortion, and that those who do not "have good reason to fear that informing their parents
will result in physical or psychological abuse to the minor (often because of previous abusive conduct or because the pregnancy is the result of intrafamily sexual activity)." Id.
at 829. Moreover, the evidence
indicated that to the extent [the parental consent law provisions] were to
cause a pregnant minor from an abusive or potentially abusive family to
seek parental consent, the statute would endanger the minor by leading her
to place herself at physical or mental risk and would exacerbate the instability and dysfunctional nature of the family relationship.
Id.
271. Id. The court also noted that
witnesses testified that past experience in other jurisdictions demonstrates
that at least some minors who are too frightened or ashamed to consult their
parents also will be too frightened or ashamed to go to court... and may
resort to the dangerous alternatives of either attempting to terminate their
pregnancy themselves or seeking an illegal, back-alley abortion.
Id.
272. Id. at 825-26.
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T. W., the Florida court held that a parental consent statute violated
the express right of privacy contained in the Florida Constitution.7 3
The Florida court looked closely at the language and history of its
privacy guarantee in concluding that it encompassed young women
seeking abortion and that it offered more protection than the Federal
Constitution. 27 4 The court applied the strict scrutiny standard of
review and found that the state's interests in protecting the wellbeing of immature minors and preserving family integrity were not
sufficiently compelling to justify the law.275 Significantly, in evaluating these asserted governmental interests, the court was deeply troubled by the state's different treatment of abortion.27 6 As in American
Academy of Pediatrics,the court was unable to reconcile Florida's
alleged interest in a minor's well-being in the context of abortion with
the state's silence on a minor's decision to give birth or to give up a
child for adoption:
[A] minor may consent, without parental approval, to any medical
procedure involving her pregnancy or her existing child - no
matter how dire the possible consequences - except abortion....
In light of this wide authority that the state grants an unwed
minor to make life-or-death decisions concerning herself or an
existing child without parental consent, we are unable to discern
a special compelling interest on the part of the state under Florida
law in protecting the minor only where abortion is concerned. 7
Following T. W., the Florida legislature enacted a parental
notificationlaw.2 7 In 2003, the Florida Supreme Court revisited the
issues raised in T.W when it considered the constitutionality of this
statute. In North Florida Women's Health & Counseling Services,
Inc. v. State, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed T. W and struck
down the notification statute.2 79 The decision is noteworthy in several
273. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1194, 1196 (Fla. 1989). For a more thorough discussion
of T.W., see Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Right of Privacy in State ConstitutionalLaw, 37
RUTGERS L.J. 971, 1017-20 (2005).
274. See T.W, 551 So. 2d at 1191-93.
275. Id. at 1193-95.
276. Id. at 1195.
277. Id. at 1193-95. The court also concluded that the law's judicial bypass procedure
failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards for young women because it made no
provision for a lawyer or for a record hearing to memorialize the trial court's reasons for
its decision. Id. at 1196.
278. See Parental Notice of Abortion Act, FLA. STAT. § 390.01115 (2004). The Act prohibited a young woman from obtaining an abortion until at least forty-eight hours after
actual notice of the abortion was given to one parent by either the attending or referring
physician. Id. The Act provided for an alternative judicial bypass procedure. Id.
279. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 615
(Fla. 2003). After the decision in North FloridaWomen's Health, Florida state legislators
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respects. First, the court rejected the state's argument that it should
"recede" from T. W. and replace the strict scrutiny standard with the
Casey undue burden standard." ° In declining to do so, the court reasoned that continued application of the more protective strict scrutiny
standard was consistent with the text of Florida's express privacy
guarantee."' The court also emphasized that application of the familiar strict scrutiny standard was well supported by long standing
Florida precedent and consistent with the will of Florida voters:
In order to adopt the "undue burden" standard... we would
have to abandon an extensive body of clear and settled Florida
precedent in favor of an ambiguous federal standard. Most important, however, we would have to forsake the will of the people.
If Floridians had been satisfied with the degree of protection
afforded by the federal right of privacy, they never would have
adopted their own freestanding Right of Privacy Clause. In adopting the privacy amendment, Floridians deliberately opted for substantially more protection than the federal charter provides. 2
Second, the court rejected the state's attempt to distinguish T. W on
the grounds that the new notification law was less burdensome than
a consent law.2 "3 In dismissing this argument, which has gained some
traction in federal abortion jurisprudence,2 the court credited the
passed a joint resolution to amend the state constitution to establish that the legislature
may require parental notification for abortion as long as the law provides for certain
exceptions and a judicial bypass procedure. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, WHO
DECIDES? THE STATUS OF WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: FLORIDA

(2009), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/choice-action-center/in-your-state/who-decides/
state-profileslflorida.html?templateName=lawdetails&issueID=6&ssumID=2525. The
resolution, which then became a ballot initiative, was approved by Florida voters in 2004,
thereby amending the Florida Constitution to allow parental notification. Id.; see also
supranote 177 (describing how other state constitutions treat abortion). The Florida legislature reenacted a parental notification law in 2005. See Womancare of Orlando, Inc. v.
Agwunobi, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1309, 1329-30 (N.D. Fla. 2005) (sustaining notification
statute under Federal Constitution).
280. North FloridaWomen's Health, 866 So. 2d at 634.
281. Id. at 634-35 ("'The Florida privacy] amendment embraces more privacy interests, and extends more protection to the individual in those interests, than does the federal
Constitution.'" (citing In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989))).
282. Id. at 635-36.
283. Id. at 631-32.
284. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 n.17 (1981) (rejecting the notion that
notice statutes are equivalent to consent statutes); Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge
v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352, 367 (4th Cir. 1998) (upholding parental notification law with
a discretionary bypass provision because there was "substantial authority from the Court
emphasizing the fundamental differences between consent and notice statutes,... the
Constitution does not require .. . 'mere notice' statutes [to contain] the full panoply of
safeguards required by the Court in Bellotti II for parental consent statutes"); see also
Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron I1), 497 U.S. 502, 510 (1990) (declining to
rule on whether parental notification laws must contain a judicial bypass provision). For

2009]

ROE AT THIRTY-SIX AND BEYOND

517

trial court's finding that the "intended and expected effect" of a notification law is the same as that of a consent law and that notification,
like consent, "constitutes a significant intrusion on a minor's right of
privacy."28 5 Finally, the court restated its concern that in enacting
the notification law, the state had again singled out abortion for
regulation without compelling justification:
Critical to the trial court's decision - and to our decision
today - is the fact that nothing whatsoever has changed in this
statutory scheme since T.W was decided....
"The contrast between the Legislature's treatment of a
minor's decision to choose an abortion and its treatment ofcomparable decisions by a minor is as stark today as it was [then].""
Most recently, the Alaska Supreme Court invalidated a parental
consent law under that state's explicit privacy guarantee.2 7 The court
agreed that the state's asserted interests in "protecting minors...
and aiding parents in fulfilling their parental responsibilities ....
are compelling interests," but rejected the statutory scheme because
it was not the least restrictive means of achieving those interests.2
The court reasoned that the consent requirement improperly "shifts"
a minor's right to choose abortion to her parents. 28 9 The court found
that the bypass mechanism did not effectively relieve young women
of the burden of parental consent because that "procedure[] build[s]
in delay that may prove 'detrimental to the physical health of the
minor,' particularly for minors in rural Alaska who 'already face
logistical obstacles to obtaining an abortion."'"2 9 0 Unlike the Florida
Supreme Court, however, the Alaska court spoke approvingly of notification laws, accepting the notion that such laws are "less burdensome" than consent statutes.2 9 '
a thorough analysis of federal abortion jurisprudence on parental notification laws, see
Amanda M. Lanham, Note, ParentalNotification Under the Undue Burden Standard:
Is a Bypass Mechanism Required?, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 551 (2006).
285. North FloridaWomen's Health, 866 So. 2d at 631-32.
286. Id. at 633.
287. State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska (Alaska fl), 171 P.3d 577, 579 (Alaska
2007). In an earlier opinion, the Alaska Supreme Court held that its express privacy guarantee extended to minors. State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska (Alaska1), 35 P.3d 30,
39-41 (Alaska 2001) (relying upon "the Alaska Constitution's language and values," Alaska
precedent, and decisions in other states). The court remanded the case "for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the parental consent or judicial authorization act
actually furthers compelling state interests using the least restrictive means." Id. at 46.
288. Alaska II, 171 P.3d at 582, 585.
289. Id. at 583.
290. Id. at 584.
291. Id. at 579; see, e.g., id. at 585 ("[A] notification requirement may actually better
serve the State's compelling interests.").
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Other courts have extended broad protection to young women
via state constitutional provisions other than explicit privacy clauses.
In Planned Parenthoodof CentralNew Jersey v. Farmer,the New
Jersey Supreme Court struck down a parental notification law on
equal protection grounds because the law unconstitutionally distinguished between young women who sought abortions and those who
sought medical care relating to their pregnancies.2 9 2 In stark contrast to the federal decisions highlighted in Part I,29 the Planned
Parenthoodof CentralNew Jersey court's analysis is especially noteworthy for its willingness to assess the impact of the law in the context of the real life challenges that make access to abortion difficult
for young women."' The court also carefully considered the ways in
which abortion laws exploit and exacerbate those difficulties, emphasizing that "additional impediments added to existing impediments
29
may well prevent the exercise of a fundamental right altogether." 5
The court concluded that both the notice requirement and the bypass
mechanism significantly burdened young women seeking abortion
by threatening their health and potentially "operat[ing] as a func296
tional bar to a minor's exercise of her constitutional right" of privacy.
As in the privacy-based opinions of the California and Florida courts,
the New Jersey Supreme Court also rejected the state's effort to justify
297
the burdensome law on the ground that "'abortion is different."'
The court reasoned that the state's asserted interest in young women
seeking abortion was "difficult to justify" given "that the State has
recognized a minor's maturity in matters relating to her sexuality,
reproductive decisions, substance-abuse treatment, and placing her
29
children for adoption." 8
A Montana court used this same reasoning when it invalidated
Montana's parental notification law 299 after the Supreme Court declined to do so in Lambert v. Wicklund. °° Significantly, in finding
that the Montana consent law "create[d] unequal and unfair application to pregnant minors who want to terminate their pregnancy,"
the Montana court emphasized the unique challenges confronting
Montana teens as they seek to access abortion services:
292. Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 621 (N.J. 2000).
293. See supranotes 112-20 and accompanying text.
294. See Planned Parenthoodof CentralNew Jersey, 762 A.2d at 632-38.
295. Id. at 636.
296. Id. at 634.
297. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 634
(Fla. 2003); PlannedParenthoodof CentralNew Jersey, 762 A.2d at 636.
298. PlannedParenthoodof CentralNew Jersey, 762 A.2d at 636.
299. Wicklund v. State, No. ADV 97-671, 1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1116 (Mont. Dist.
Ct. Feb. 11, 1999).
300. Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 293 (1997) (per curiam); see supra note 130.
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Montana is particularly difficult in availability of abortion
providers. Thirty percent of women seeking abortions have to
travel at least 100 miles, due to geographical distances and
scarcity of abortion providers. Burdens on adolescents are much
greater than on adults for traveling such distances. The added
burdens on these minors create greater risks of delayed abortions
and consequential medical problems." 1
The Massachusetts Supreme Court relied on both equal protection and implied privacy provisions in striking down an onerous twoparent consent statute.0 2 While the court agreed that the state was
justified in requiring the consent of one parent, it specifically rejected
federal precedent that sustained two-parent consent mandates.0 3 In
contrast, in Pro-ChoiceMississippiv. Fordice,the Mississippi Supreme
Court upheld Mississippi's requirement that young women seeking
abortion obtain the consent of both parents.0 4 Oddly, the court began
its analysis by noting that it had previously declared the right of privacy "the most comprehensive and guarded right emanating from
the Mississippi Constitution" and in past opinions had applied the
strict scrutiny standard in evaluating governmental interference with
this right.0 5 The court also concluded that its constitutional guarantee of "privacy includes an implied right to choose whether or not
to have an abortion."3 6 Nonetheless, in evaluating the two-parent
consent mandate, the court turned to precedent from the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts, opting to apply Casey's undue burden standard and finding that the judicial bypass alternative cured
any burdens posed by the statute. 307 Thus, despite its rhetoric about
the breadth and importance of Mississippi's privacy guarantee, the
court with scant analysis construed its constitution consistent with
301. Wicklund, 1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1116, at *18-19 (citation omitted).
302. Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 677 N.E.2d 101, 109
(Mass. 1997).
303. Id. The court reasoned that requiring both parents to consent was an unjustified
burden on young women's right to abortion, particularly in cases of incest or where the
parents never married or never lived together. Id. at 107. Rejecting the Supreme Court's
analysis in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), the court found that the presence
of the judicial bypass option did not cure the unconstitutionality of the two-parent
requirement because it simply added unnecessary "delay and emotional stress" when the
purpose of the statute had already been fulfilled by the consent of one parent. Id. at 108.
304. Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 95-CA-00960-SCT ( 75) (Miss. 1998).
305. Id.
29, 34 (citing In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1039 (Miss. 1985)).
306. Id. 30. The court rejected the State of Mississippi's argument that the framers
of the Mississippi Constitution intended to omit protection for abortion because it found
that at the time the constitution was adopted, abortion was in fact legal until the point
of quickening. Id.
20-21.
307. Id.
35, 40-53.
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the Federal Constitution, declining a broader, more independent
interpretation in the specific context of abortion rights." 8
3. ChallengingMandatory Waiting Periods,Biased
CounselingProvisions,Laws Targeting the Medical
Practiceof Providers and Other Abortion Restrictions
The unwillingness of most federal courts to apply the undue
burden standard so as to provide a reasonable measure of protection
against laws similar to those upheld in Casey has led reproductive
rights litigators to turn to state courts for enhanced protection against
these restrictions. While most state courts have upheld waiting
period and counseling provisions under state constitutions,0 9 in two
noteworthy instances state courts rejected them." 0 The Tennessee
Supreme Court's opinion in PlannedParenthoodof Middle Tennessee
v. Sundquist3 1 ' represents the strongest rejection of the Casey plurality's analysis by a state court.
308. The court explained:
While we have previously analyzed cases involving the state constitutional
right to privacy under a strict scrutiny standard... we are not bound to
apply that standard in all privacy cases. The abortion issue is much more
complex .... We are placed in the precarious position of both protecting a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability and protecting
unborn life.
Id.
34. The court rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on T.W. and American Academy of
Pediatricsbecause "both Florida and California have State Constitutions with explicit
right to privacy clauses, while Mississippi's Constitution has only an inferred right to
privacy." Id.
52.
309. Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 837 N.E.2d 973, 975 (Ind. 2005) (sustaining
eighteen-hour waiting period and biased counseling provision under declaration of rights
clause of state constitution); Mahaffey v. Attorney Gen., 564 N.W.2d 104, 107-08, 111
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam) (sustaining twenty-four hour waiting period and biased
counseling provision on grounds that Michigan "does not guarantee a right to abortion
that is separate and distinct from the federal right"); Pro-Choice Mississippi, 95-CA00960-SCT ( 74) (sustaining twenty-four hour waiting period and biased counseling
provision under implicit privacy guarantee of state constitution); Reprod. Health Servs.
of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon, 185 S.W.3d 685, 687-88,
691-92 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (sustaining both twenty-four hour waiting period and biased
counseling provision under due process and equal rights clauses of state constitution);
Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 573-84 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (sustaining
twenty-four hour waiting period and biased counseling provision under inalienable rights,
equal protection, freedom of speech and freedom of worship clauses of state constitution);
see also State v. Presidential Women's Ctr., 937 So. 2d 114, 115-16 (Fla. 2006) (sustaining
counseling provision as not unconstitutionally vague based on narrowing construction
agreed to by the State).
310. Planned Parenthood of Missoula v. State, No. BDV 95-722, 1999 Mont. Dist.
LEXIS 1117, at *8-9, *21-22 (Mont. Dist. Mar. 12, 1999) (invalidating Montana's twentyfour hour waiting period on state constitutional privacy grounds and declaring portion
of counseling provision unconstitutionally vague); Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn.
v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 4, 10-11, 22-24 (Tenn. 2000) (invalidating a two-day waiting
period under both state implied privacy guarantee and Casey's undue burden standard).
311. See Planned Parenthoodof Middle Tennessee, 38 S.W.3d at 14-17.
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In Planned Parenthoodof Middle Tennessee, decided in 2000,
the court continued its tradition - begun in its decision in Davis v.
Davis 12 - of extending broad state constitutional protection to procreational autonomy.3 13 The court reaffirmed its analysis in Davis that
the Tennessee Constitution's Declaration of Rights extends greater
protection to the right of privacy than the Federal Constitution. " Invoking Davis and its progeny, the court held that because a woman's
right to abortion "is closely aligned with matters of marriage, child
rearing, and other procreational interests that have previously been
held to be fundamental,"3 1' 5 restrictions on abortion are subject to
exacting scrutiny.3 1 The court also firmly rejected the application
of the Casey undue burden standard, denouncing it as "essentially no
standard at all" that "allows judges to impose their own subjective
views of the propriety of the legislation."3 17 Moreover, in the court's
view, the undue burden standard afforded woefully inadequate protection to its citizens:
[The Casey test offers our judges no real guidance and engenders
no expectation among the citizenry that governmental regulation
of abortion will be objective, evenhanded, or well-reasoned. This
Court finds no justification for exchanging the long established
constitutional doctrine of strict scrutiny for a test.., that would
relegate a fundamental right of the citizens of Tennessee to the
personal caprice of an individual judge.318
Applying the strict scrutiny standard, the PlannedParenthood
of Middle Tennessee court found that neither Tennessee's two-day
312. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). In Davis, involving a divorced
couple's dispute over the control of frozen embryos, the court held that the Tennessee
Constitution's implied protection of the right to privacy encompassed a right of procreational autonomy that included the right to decide for oneself whether or not to become
a parent. Id. at 598-604. The court ruled in favor of the husband who sought to stop his
former wife from donating their frozen embryos to another couple for implantation. Id.
at 604-05.
313. PlannedParenthoodof Middle Tennessee, 38 S.W.3d at 10, 12.
314. Id. at 12-15. The court highlighted the distinct text of the Tennessee Constitution,
which "recognizes that our government serves at the will of the people of Tennessee, and
expressly advocates active resistence [sic] against the government when government no
longer functions to serve the people's needs." Id. at 14. In the court's view, "[t]his provision
exemplifies the strong and unique concept of liberty embodied in our constitution." Id.
315. Id. at 15. The court emphasized that since Davis,Tennessee courts had extended
privacy protection to a variety of other areas, including child custody and consensual adult
homosexuality. Id. at 10.
316. Id. at 17.
317. Id. at 16.
318. Id. at 17; see also Planned Parenthood of Missoula v. State, No. BDV 95-722, 1999
Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1117, *2-3, *7-8 (Mont. Dist. Mar. 12, 1999) (applying strict scrutiny
standard to evaluate constitutionality of waiting period and finding that the state had
advanced no compelling interest to support it).
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waiting period nor its counseling provision was constitutionally justifiable.319 The court held that the counseling provision, which required
that women must be orally informed of state-prescribed information
by their attending physicians, was not narrowly tailored to further
a compelling state interest.3 2 ° Although the court agreed that it was
important for women to be adequately informed about the abortion
procedure, it found that other health professionals were competent
to provide the required information, and therefore it was not necessary for a physician personally to convey the information.3 21
Relying on Akron I, in which the Supreme Court struck down
a forced waiting period under the Roe strict scrutiny and trimester
framework, the court held that the Tennessee waiting period was likewise constitutionally deficient because it failed to further the state's
interest in protecting women's health.3 22 The court acknowledged that
"'a woman... should be allowed "sufficient time for reflection,""'
before she decides to have an abortion.3 23 However, the court echoed
the trial court's determination that what constitutes sufficient time
for reflection "'varies with each individual woman"' and that trial testimony established that "'most women have seriously contemplated
their decision"' to have an abortion before making their initial appointment with the physician. 4 "'To mandate that she wait even
longer,"' declared the court, "'insults the intelligence and decisionmaking capabilities of a woman."'"32 5 The court also emphasized that
the waiting period exacerbated the existing hardships of obtaining
an abortion given that "many women must travel long distances"
and take time off from work to have an abortion.32 6 The two-visit
319. Planned Parenthoodof Middle Tennessee, 38 S.W.3d at 21-22. The court also
found that a requirement that second trimester abortions be performed in hospitals was
not narrowly tailored to serve the state's compelling interest in protecting the woman's
health and was therefore invalid under the Tennessee Constitution. Id. at 18-19. The
court reasoned that this requirement was unconstitutional under the federal undue
burden standard because it lacked a medical emergency exception. Id. at 19.
320. Id. at 21. The court recognized two state interests as sufficiently compelling to
overcome the woman's right to abortion - the state's interest in the woman's health,
which it deemed compelling from the beginning of the pregnancy, and the state's interest
in potential life, which becomes compelling only at the point of fetal viability. Id. at 17.
321. Id. at 21-22. The court also concluded that the physician-only counseling
provision was invalid under the undue burden standard. Id. at 22. Because the
information could be provided by another health professional, with the same result
achieved, the court found that "the purpose or effect of the physician-only requirement
is to 'place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion."' Id. (quoting
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992)).
322. Id. at 23-24 (citing City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc. (Akron 1),
462 U.S. 416 (1983)); see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
323. PlannedParenthoodof Middle Tennessee, 38 S.W.3d at 23.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 24.
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requirement was "especially problematic
for women who suffer from
327
poverty or abusive relationships."
Other courts - including three state supreme courts - have
sustained waiting periods and biased counseling provisions.3 11 Most
of these courts resist a truly independent analysis of these laws and,
as in the lower federal court decisions discussed in Part I, incorrectly apply the outcome in Casey to sustain them.3 19 In Pro-Choice
Mississippi v. Fordice,for example, the Mississippi Supreme Court
upheld the state's counseling and waiting period provision along
with its two-parent consent requirement. 33' The court offered virtually
no analysis other than to cite Casey and Barnes v. Moore, an earlier
federal appeals court decision that sustained a facial challenge to the
Mississippi law.33 1 In Barnes, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals denied the plaintiff-providers the opportunity to put on proof
of the specific burdens imposed on Mississippi women by these provisions. 332 The Barnes court reasoned that the Casey analysis and
327. Id. The court held that the waiting period also failed the undue burden standard,
reasoning that the burdensome length of the waiting period - the longest in the nation -

"suggests that the waiting period requirement is not intended as an opportunity for
reflection, but is actually intended as an obstacle to abortion." Id.
328. See, e.g., Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 837 N.E.2d 973, 976, 981 (Ind. 2005)
(upholding an Indiana statute requiring counseling and a waiting period before a woman
may obtain an abortion); Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 95-CA-00960-SCT ( 36-39) (Miss.
1998) (rejecting a challenge to Mississippi's counseling and waiting period statute);
Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon, 185
S.W.3d 685, 687, 691-92 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam) (upholding Missouri's counseling
and waiting period statute).
329. See, e.g., Pro-ChoiceMississippi,95-CA-00960-SCT (I 31-39) (discussing Casey
and applying it directly to state constitutional analysis). In one deviation from this
pattern, a Michigan appeals court upheld a waiting period and counseling provision after
undertaking an independent analysis of its constitution and found no protection whatsoever for the right to abortion. Mahaffey v. Attorney Gen., 564 N.W.2d 104, 111 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1997) ("[T]he Michigan Constitution does not guarantee a right to abortion that
is separate and distinct from the federal right.").
330. Pro-ChoiceMississippi, 95-CA-00960-SCT (
73-75); supra notes 304-08 and
accompanying text. Plaintiffs had framed their challenge as both facial and as applied.
Pro-ChoiceMississippi, 95-CA-00960-SCT ( 79) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
331. Pro-ChoiceMississippi,95-CA-00960-SCT (IT 37-38) (citing Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) and Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1992)).
The court concluded: "Because the mandatory consultation and twenty-four hour delay
ensures that a woman has given thoughtful consideration in deciding whether to obtain
an abortion, [the statute] does not create an undue burden and is therefore constitutional." Id.
39; see also Clinic for Women, 837 N.E.2d at 975, 980 (rejecting facial
challenge to counseling and waiting period based on Salerno and finding that provisions
would also survive an as applied challenge because they imposed no "material burden" on
Indiana women); Nixon, 185 S.W.3d at 691-92 (applying Casey analysis in upholding
counseling and waiting period under the Missouri Constitution); Preterm Cleveland v.
Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 577 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (relying on Casey in sustaining
waiting period and counseling provisions).
332. Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 15 (5th Cir. 1992).
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outcome controlled because the Mississippi provisions were substantially the same as Pennsylvania's had been, and therefore the plaintiffs could not satisfy the "'heavy burden"' of the Salerno standard,
which it deemed applicable in that facial challenge.3"' The court
in Pro-ChoiceMississippi erred both in applying Barnes to the asapplied challenge before it and in repeating its methodological mistake
of imposing Casey's result instead of Casey's standard. In a stinging
dissent, Justice Sullivan argued that the undue burden standard
required an analysis of the actual impact of the law on Mississippi
women and that the plaintiffs had met their burden - via affidavits
documenting the actual effects of the law - of showing genuine fact
issues sufficient to warrant a trial on the merits.33 4
Post-Caseystate court challenges outside the context of counseling and waiting period provisions have proven more successful. In two
particularly strong opinions, state supreme courts held that efforts to
stop the performance of abortions by certain providers violated their
state constitutions. In Armstrong v. State, the Montana Supreme
Court struck down a Montana law that prohibited physician assistants
from performing abortions; 335 whereas, in Mazurek v. Armstrong,
discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court had sustained this same
law under the Casey undue burden standard.3 6 In Valley Hospital
Associationv. Mat-Su Coalitionfor Choice,the Alaska Supreme Court
invalidated a community hospital's ban on most abortion services.3 37
In both instances, these courts unanimously found broader protection for the right to abortion than that available under Casey based
on the express guarantees of privacy contained in their state constitutions and held that restrictions on abortion must survive the strict
scrutiny standard.3 Significantly, in applying the strict scrutiny
standard, both courts emphasized the requirement of government
evenhandedness in policy making that affects reproductive rights. 39
333. Id. at 14-15 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).

334. Pro-ChoiceMississippi, 95-CA-00960-SCT ( 7 78-83) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
Justice Sullivan highlighted affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs, which established

that "after the law went into effect, the number of Mississippi women obtaining abortions decreased by 13%" and "the number of abortions ...
mester increased by 18%." Id.
81.

performed in the second tri-

335. Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, 1 75, 296 Mont. 361, 75, 989 P.2d 364, 75.
336. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968,969, 971,976 (1997) (per curiam); see supra
notes 149-54 and accompanying text.

337. Valley Hospital Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 965-69, 971-72
(Alaska 1997); see also Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1,
18-19 (Tenn. 2000) (invalidating second trimester hospitalization requirement under

Tennessee Constitution). The hospital's policy prohibited abortion except where the fetus
had a fatal anomaly, the woman's life was endangered, or the pregnancy was the result
of rape or incest. Valley Hospital, 948 P.2d at 965.
338. Valley Hospital, 948 P.2d at 966-69; Armstrong, 1999 MT 261, 41.
339. See Valley Hospital, 948 P.2d at 968, 972; Armstrong, 1999 MT 261, 7 67-72.
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In Armstrong, the court declared that a key aspect of the "right
of procreative autonomy is a woman's moral right and moral responsibility to decide, up to the point of fetal viability, what her pregnancy
demands of her in the context of her individual values, her beliefs as
to the sanctity of life, and her personal situation."34 0 The state, on
the other hand, "has no more compelling interest.., for interfering
with... this right if the woman chooses to terminate her pre-viability
341
pregnancy than it would if she chose to carry the fetus to term."
The court rejected the state's contention that its effort to stop physician assistants from performing abortions was necessary to protect
women's health.3 4 2 In an analysis strikingly similar to that of the
American Academy of Pediatricsand T. W. courts,34 3 the Armstrong
court found that this contention was undermined by the fact that
Montana allowed physician assistants to perform "other more risky
medical procedures such as uncomplicated deliveries of babies, inserting IUDs, and prescribing and administering most drugs."3 Instead,
based on the legislative record, the court found that the law - which
prevented the only physician's assistant performing abortions in
Montana from doing so - was impermissibly motivated by "unrelenting pressure from individuals and organizations promoting their own
particular values" who specifically intended to make abortion as difficult as possible for Montana women.3 45 On this basis, the court found
that the ban was not supported
by any constitutionally permissible
346
interest.
governmental
Similarly, in Valley Hospital, the Alaska Supreme Court held
that a community hospital had not demonstrated a compelling interest to justify its refusal to perform most abortions. 347 The hospital
had offered no health justification, and its assertion that the policy
was justified as a matter of conscience was deemed insufficient because a nonsectarian hospital cannot assert a free exercise claim.348
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Armstrong, 1999 MT 261, 49.
Id.
Id.
66.
See supranotes 246-77 and accompanying text.
Armstrong, 1999 MT 261, 64 (footnote omitted).
Id.
20, 65.

346. Id. 7 63-66.
347. Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963,965,971 (Alaska 1997).

The court found that the hospital was a "quasi-public institution" subject to the provisions
of the Alaska Constitution because: (1) the hospital had a "special relationship with the
State through the State's Certificate of Need program" and this was the only hospital
approved under the program to serve the Mat-Su Valley area; (2) the construction of the
hospital was financed with state, local, and federal funds; and (3) a significant portion
of funds received for hospital services came from public funds. Id. at 970-71. Moreover,
"the hospital [was] a community hospital whose board is elected by a public membership."
Id. at 971.
348. See id. at 971-72 & n.20.
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The court emphasized that although the hospital had "a 'sincere moral
belief' that elective abortion is wrong .... constitutional rights 'cannot
be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them."'"
Finally, principles of neutrality also underlay a Tennessee court's
decision to strike down a law that imposed burdensome administrative, professional qualification, and facilities requirements on abortion
providers that were not imposed on other health care providers. 5 '
Relying on Planned Parenthoodof Middle Tennessee, the court applied a strict scrutiny standard of review and found that the state had
offered no compelling justification for singling out abortion providers
for different treatment than that of other health care providers:
There is evidence in the record showing that first trimester abortions are less likely to result in complications than many other
surgical procedures that are routinely performed in doctor's [sic]
offices.... A tonsillectomy carries a risk of death twice as high

as that of a legal abortion. The proof would justify a conclusion
that there is no medical justification for treating abortions differently from other medical procedures of similar complexity and
risk.35'
Other state courts have rejected challenges to laws that target the
medical practice of abortion for special regulation based on principles of deference to the government's broad power to regulate health
matters.35 2
III. EVALUATING THE STRATEGY OF CHALLENGING ABORTION
RESTRICTIONS IN STATE COURTS

As the decisions highlighted in Part II demonstrate, the strategy
of invoking the protections of state constitutions to vindicate abortion
349. Id. at 972 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)) (footnote
omitted). The Valley Hospitalcourt held that a state statute which allowed hospitals and
individuals to refuse to participate in abortions was unconstitutional to the extent it
applied to quasi-public institutions. Id. at 971-72.
350. Tenn. Dep't of Health v. Boyle, No. M2001-01738-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31840685,
at *1, *7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2002). Under the statute, any facility used to terminate
a pregnancy at any stage was deemed an "ambulatory surgical treatment center" ("ASTC').
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-201(3) (West 2008). The statute exempted only those private
physicians' offices that did not perform a "substantial number" of abortions. Id. The
"enormous" consequences of being an ASTC designation included the requirements of
Department of Health licensing and obtaining a certificate of need prior to establishing
a health care facility. Boyle, 2002 WL 31840685, at *1.
351. Boyle, 2002 WL 31840685, at *7-8.
352. See, e.g., Tucker v. State Dep't of Pub. Health, 650 So. 2d 910,912-14 (Ala. Civ. App.
1994) (upholding Alabama law that required private abortion providers to obtain licenses
as reproductive health centers for their office facilities).
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rights has yielded impressive victories in many state courts and resounding losses in others. This section analyzes the promises and pitfalls of this litigation strategy and offers some suggestions for future
reproductive rights litigation in the state courts.
A. The Advantages of State ConstitutionalProtection
The many positive outcomes in state courts over the past thirty
years demonstrate that state constitutions are providing a significant
alternative avenue for relief from restrictive abortion laws. Of course,
the success of this strategy hinges on state courts' willingness to adopt
broad and independent interpretations of state privacy and equality
guarantees. When state courts are willing to do this, the likelihood
of advocates mounting successful legal challenges increases dramatically. As discussed in Part I, the fact-intensive Casey undue burden
standard places a heavy burden on litigators to document that abortion restrictions pose substantial obstacles to women's access to abortion. In applying this standard, many federal courts have imposed
unattainable evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs.35 3 In contrast, state
courts that undertake a more protective approach to reproductive
autonomy adopt the strict scrutiny standard of review, and many
apply it more stringently than the federal courts did under Roe.354
Once plaintiffs meet their threshold burden of showing that an abortion restriction has some impact on abortion access, these state courts
shift the burden to the government to demonstrate that compelling
governmental interests justify the infringement on individual rights
and that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.35 5
Moreover, in contrast to the Supreme Court's increasing tolerance for
laws that infringe on reproductive liberty by heavy-handedly intruding
on women's decision-making capacity,5 6 state courts have enhanced
353. See supranotes 96-123 and accompanying text.
354. See generally supraPart II.B (discussing state court challenges to restrictions on
public funding, parental involvement laws, waiting periods, and other abortion laws).
355. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 18
(Tenn. 2000) ("Under the strict scrutiny standard, it is the State's burden to show that
the regulation is justified by a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest."); Boyle, 2002 WL 31840685, at *8 (holding that "the statute adversely
impacts a constitutionally protected right without a compelling state reason to justify
it" because it negatively impacts the availability of abortions, although "[t]he proof with
respect to the actual burden on a woman's right to an abortion is sketchy").
356. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) ("Even
in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations designed
to encourage her to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great
weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term and
that there are procedures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as well
as a certain degree of state assistance .... "); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S.
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protection for the abortion right by insisting on governmental neutrality toward abortion and emphasizing the paramount importance
of protecting women's health.3 5 ' Consequently, state courts have frequently rejected arguments that public funding restrictions, parental
involvement laws, and other restrictions on previability abortions are
3 5 Unlike the approach
justified because "abortion is different.""
of
some federal courts, many state courts have also undertaken highly
contextualized, fact-sensitive analyses of abortion restrictions that
incorporate the perspectives of the women and girls actually affected
by these laws.3 59 In these and other ways, the progressive approach
of many state courts maximizes protection for reproductive liberty
and in doing so makes the task of challenging abortion restrictions
more readily achievable.
Victories in individual states make an enormous difference in the
lives of the women and girls of those states by fully protecting their
right to abortion. The impact of these victories may also spread beyond an individual state's borders. In the public funding and parental
involvement decisions discussed in Part II, state courts repeatedly
noted that they were positively influenced in their decision making
by the outcomes in sister states. 361 Cutting-edge state law precedent
490, 511 (1989) ("'[The Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic
processes, from expressing a preference for normal childbirth .... ' (quoting Poelker v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977))); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (clarifying that
the state may "make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and ... implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds"). See generally supra Part L.A
(discussing McRae, Maher, Bellotti II, Webster, Casey, and Carhart).
357. See generally supra Part II.B (discussing state court challenges to restrictions on
public funding, parental involvement laws, waiting periods, and other abortion laws).
358. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 826 (Cal. 1997); Doe v.
Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 144 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling
Servs. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 633 (Fla. 2003); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1195 (Fla.
1989); Women of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 31 (Minn. 1995); Armstrong v. State,
1999 MT 261,
64-65, 296 Mont. 361,
64-65, 989 P.2d 364,
64-65; Planned
Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 638 (N.J. 2000).
359. See, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics,940 P.2d at 816-17; Maher, 515 A.2d
at 153-54; Moe v. Sec'y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 400-01 (Mass. 1981); Wicklund
v. State, No. ADV 97-671, 1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1116, at *9-10 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Feb. 11,
1999); Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey, 762 A.2d at 632-38; Planned
Parenthoodof Middle Tenn., 38 S.W.3d at 24.
360. See, e.g., State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska,
Inc., 28 P.3d 904, 905 (Alaska 2001) ("Our conclusion is supported by the majority of
jurisdictions that have considered comparable restrictions on state funding of medically
necessary abortions .. "); Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963,
967 n.7 (Alaska 1997) ('Other states have interpreted their constitutions to protect reproductive rights more extensively than does the federal constitution."); Simat Corp. v. Ariz.
Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 56 P.3d 28, 35 (Ariz. 2002) ('The majority of states
that have examined similar Medicaid funding restrictions have determined that their
state statutes or constitutions offer broader protection of individual rights than does the
United States Constitution and have found that medically necessary abortions should
be funded if the state also funds medically necessary expenses related to childbirth.");
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may also influence federal courts, including the Supreme Court itself. Indeed, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court noted that its
decision to overturn its opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick36 ' was influenced, in part, by the fact that "[t]he courts of five different States
ha[d] declined to follow it in interpreting provisions in their own state
constitutions parallel to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."36 2 Similarly, state court decisions that reject the reasoning of Casey and other federal precedent may, over the course of
time, influence the Court to strengthen protection for abortion rights
under the Federal Constitution.
State court venues also allow reproductive rights litigators to advance legal claims not typically made in federal court where abortion
rights have primarily been grounded in privacy theory.3 63 Professor
Reva Siegel, for example, has argued compellingly that sex equality
theory offers great promise for solidifying and strengthening constitutional protection for abortion rights:
The equality framework supplies explicit, textual authority for
a right that many have attacked as "unenumerated." As importantly, the equality framework identifies powerful constitutional
values at stake in the abortion right's preservation that persist
even if Roe is eviscerated or reversed. Courts can enforce equal
citizenship values by evaluating restrictions on reproductive decision making to ensure that such restrictions do not reflect or
enforce gender stereotypes about women's agency or their sexual
and family roles. Legislatures can vindicate equal citizenship
values through policies that promote the equal freedom of men
and women in sex, reproduction, and parenting. The equality
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics,940 P.2d at 826 ("In our view, the Florida Supreme Court's
reasoning in [T.W is persuasive.'); PlannedParenthoodof CentralNew Jersey, 762 A.2d
at 630 ("California and Massachusetts have rejected, on state constitutional grounds,....
parental consent statutes [even though they] contain[ed] judicial bypass provisions.').
361. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
362. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 (citing Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002));
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487
(Ky. 1992); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926
S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996)). The Court reasoned that these state precedents, along with
a variety of other sources, showed "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." Id. at 572. See generally SHAMAN, supra note 32, at 215-22 (discussing
state court decisions that influenced the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence).
363. As discussed in Part I, although Roe and subsequent cases located protection for
abortion rights in the privacy theory, in Casey, the Court highlighted the link between
reproductive autonomy and equality. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. For a
comprehensive history of advocates' efforts to advance sex equality as a legal basis for the
abortion right before and after Roe, see Siegel, Sex Equality, supra note 28, at 823-34.
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framework serves as a reminder, in law and in politics, that justifications for limiting women's freedom that were constitutionally
reasonable in 1860 or 1960 may no longer be so today."
Judicial recognition of a sex equality theory is especially important
now as anti-abortion advocates increasingly assert "women-protectionist" arguments to justify a wide range of restrictions on abortion, including bans.36 5 These arguments, which influenced Justice
366 may be effectively countered by
Kennedy's reasoning in Carhart,
a sex equality approach:
The equality framework invites courts to analyze this new
woman-protective justification... to ensure it does not enforce
views of women associated with traditions of gender paternalism
the nation has renounced. Woman-protective restrictions on abortion, like any other seemingly benign form of sex-based state
action, may neither reflect nor enforce stereotypical assumptions
about women's capacities as decision makers or their role as
mothers.3 6 7

As noted in Part II of this Article, reproductive rights advocates have
asserted sex discrimination arguments in several state court challenges to restrictive abortion laws.368 Admittedly, some state courts
have been more receptive than others to sex equality arguments.3 69
Especially in those states with explicit guarantees of sex equality,37 °
however, state courts provide a fertile testing ground for these claims.
Pioneering opinions, such as the New Mexico Supreme Court's opinion in New Mexico Right to Choose, 71 could positively influence other
courts, both state and federal, to apply sex equality analysis in limiting restrictions on abortion.
364. Siegel, Sex Equality,supra note 28, at 833-34 (footnotes omitted).
365. See Siegel, The New Politics, supra note 28, at 993; supra note 169 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
367. Siegel, Sex Equality, supra note 28, at 836. Indeed, these very arguments were
advanced by Justice Ginsburg in her dissenting opinion in Carhart.Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[Legal challenges to undue restrictions
on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather,
they center on a woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy
equal citizenship stature."); supranote 171 and accompanying text; see also Siegel, The
New Politics,supranote 28, at 1053 (arguing that if the Supreme Court were to reverse
Roe, abortion bans such as the one proposed in South Dakota in 2006 would violate equal
protection guarantees).
368. See supra notes 218-33 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 218.
370. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
371. N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, 975 P.2d 841; see
supra notes 219-33 and accompanying text.
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B. The Limitations and Pitfalls of Securing Abortion Rights in
State Courts
In an era of diminished federal constitutional protection for abortion, a state court strategy is an important component of a broadbased campaign to strengthen protection for reproductive autonomy.
However, this strategy is not in any sense an abortion rights panacea.
A state court approach ultimately yields far more limited protection
than a federal litigation strategy: only women in states in which
judges are willing to undertake a progressive approach to reproductive
autonomy are directly impacted. As others have argued, securing full
protection for reproductive autonomy under the Federal Constitution,
and thereby guaranteeing protection for all women, is far preferable. 7 2 Efforts to restore full protection for abortion rights at the federal level must continue. In other words, state court litigation must
go forward, as it has in the past, in tandem with continued federal
court litigation, legislative strategies to safeguard reproductive rights,
and an electoral strategy that targets high impact political campaigns
with the goal of increasing the number of pro-choice politicians and
judges.
Moreover, from a practical standpoint, the strategy of safeguarding abortion rights through state constitutions involves difficult
challenges and potential pitfalls. Despite its successes, the reality
remains that many state court judges are simply not willing to engage in a truly independent analysis that leads to protection beyond
that required by the Federal Constitution. As Pro-ChoiceMississippi
v. Fordice,73 Bell v. Low-Income Women of Texas,37 4 and other opinions highlighted in Part II illustrate, many state courts place heavy,
unexamined reliance on federal abortion precedent. State constitutional law scholars have frequently criticized this tendency of state
courts to reflexively rely on federal precedent in interpreting their
own constitutions. 75 Although state courts can and should seek
372. See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 25, at 7 ("Fundamental liberties essential to equality
should not vary state-by-state, despite the necessity for state-by-state efforts to protect
them."); Pine & Law, supra note 178, at 436 ("To permit a right that is at the core of
individual dignity, autonomy and equality to be subject to state discretion, undercuts the
foundation of our constitutional democracy.").
373. Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 95-CA-00960-SCT (Miss. 1998); see supranotes 30408 and accompanying text.
374. Bell v. Low-Income Women of Tex., 95 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2002); see supra notes
234-38 and accompanying text.
375. See, e.g., TARR, supranote 185, at 208 ("[T]oo many states continue to rely automatically on federal law when confronted with rights issues. Even when they interpret
state guarantees, too many frame their analysis in federal doctrinal categories, making
state constitutional law merely a poor relation, stuck with ill-fitting hand-me-downs.");
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guidance from federal court opinions, including those of the Supreme
Court, 376 "'state constitutions are [not] mirror images of the federal
constitution,"' and therefore federal decisional law should not act
plainly as "a lid on the protections guaranteed under.., state constitution [s] ." 3,
Nonetheless, the tendency of state courts to engage in reflexive
adoption of federal analysis often occurs in abortion cases where personal ideology and fear of reprisal may inhibit independent constitutional analysis.378 Indeed, as Professor Gillian Metzger has argued:
'The politics of abortion may prove even more important in state
courts, where judges are often elected and decisions favoring abortion
providers may rally antiabortion groups to oppose a judge's reelection." 379 Given these political realities, the task of convincing state
judges to engage in independent constitutional analysis may be especially challenging in the abortion context. The admonition of Justice
Hans Linde, uttered nearly three decades ago, is especially apt in this
Robert F. Williams, State CourtsAdoptingFederalConstitutionalDoctrine:Case-by-Case
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1505 (2005)
(criticizing the "'unreflective adoptionism"' or "'kneejerk lockstepping"' approach in
which state courts apply "federal analysis to a state clause without acknowledging the
possibility of a different outcome, or considering arguments in favor of such a different,
or more protective, outcome") (citations omitted).
376. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing
Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights
Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1063-64 (1997) ("State constitutional provisions need not, and should not, be reduced to a 'row of shadows' through too much
reliance on federal precedent. Swinging the pendulum in the other direction, however,
where too little reliance on federal precedent will 'render State practice incoherent,' is
also unnecessary."); Posting of Robert Schapiro to American Constitution Society Blog,
http://www.acsblog.org/federahsm-guest-blogger-progressivism-and.state-constitutional.
law.html (July 6, 2005, 15:26 EST) (arguing that "a narrow focus on text and history [of
state constitutions is] limiting" and that a "fruitful dialogue" between state and federal
courts is desirable). Following Casey, for example, some state courts looked to Roe, Akron I,
and other pre-Casey opinions for valuable guidance in applying the strict scrutiny standard to evaluate abortion restrictions. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v.
Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 23 (Tenn. 2000) (relying on Akron I in rejecting a mandatory
waiting period); Tenn. Dep't of Health v. Boyle, No. M2001-01738-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL
31840685, at *6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (relying, in part, on pre-Casey federal court precedent in rejecting certain abortion statutes).
377. Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 147 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
378. See Metzger, supra note 30, at 904.
379. Id.; see Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 725-29, 738-39 & n.147 (1995) (arguing that elected
judicial officers are more subject to majoritarian influences that may lead them to compromise the rights of individuals and recounting a specific instance in which anti-abortion
groups targeted a Florida justice in a reelection campaign). According to the National
Center for State Courts, the vast majority of states (thirty-nine) elect at least some of their
judges and eighty-seven percent of all state court judges must run in popular elections.
Adam Liptak, RenderingJustice,With One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,2008,
at Al.
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regard: "[T]o make an independent argument under the state clause
takes homework - in texts, in history, in alternate approaches to
analysis." 380 Reproductive rights advocates must place heavy emphasis on the distinct text, history, and past judicial interpretations
of state equality and privacy guarantees, breaking free of the prevailing narrow federal approach to abortion rights.3 8 ' As the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in PlannedParenthoodof Middle
Tennessee312 illustrates, even in the absence of express guarantees
of privacy or sex equality, some courts will honor their state's rich
judicial legacy of strong protection for individual privacy by extending it to abortion rights.
Finally, advocates must consider the possibility of backlash
against favorable state court abortion rights decisions in the form
of constitutional amendments. Unlike the Federal Constitution,
which is difficult to amend, many state constitutions are quite easily
amended.8 3 State court rulings concerning same-sex marriage, school
desegregation, school financing, and other controversial civil liberties
issues have been the target of public opposition in the form of efforts
to reverse them by amending state constitutions.3 ' State court decisions protecting abortion rights have met with similar, although
limited, opposition. In Florida, following the state supreme court's
decisions in T. W. 85 and North FloridaWomen's Health & Counseling
Services, Inc. v. Florida,"6 the Florida Constitution was successfully
380. Hans A. Linde, First Things First:Rediscovering the States'Bills of Rights, 9 U.
BALT. L. REV. 379, 392 (1980).
381. See FRIESEN, supra note 179, § 1.08[3] ("One way to break the state tie is to
imagine a world in which there is no federal law."). For a thoughtful reflection on the difficult work and challenges arising in the "third stage" of the New Judicial Federalism,
see Robert F. Williams, The Third Stage of the New JudicialFederalism,59 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 211, 219-23 (2003).
382. Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000); see
supranotes 311-27 and accompanying text.
383. See generally TARR, supranote 185, at 23-27 (discussing differences between federal and state constitutional practice with regard to mechanism of revision and amendment). While the Federal Constitution has rarely been amended, state constitutions are
regularly revised or amended. See id. at 24 (noting that while the Federal Constitution
has only been amended twenty-seven times, as of 1996, over 5,900 amendments had been
added to state constitutions, "an average of almost 120 amendments per state").
384. See generally SHAMAN, supra note 32, at 246-53 (discussing legislative and popular
backlash against the recognition of new rights by state courts).
385. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989); see supra notes 273-77 and accompanying
text.
386. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. Florida, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla.
2003); see supranotes 279-86 and accompanying text. Following the recent departure of
one member of the Alaska Supreme Court and the appointment of a new justice to that
court by Governor Sarah Paln, the governor and some members of the state legislature
are supporting a bill to restore a parental consent requirement for young women in
Alaska. See Our View: ParentalConsent? Teens Seeking Abortion Must Make Their Own
Decisions, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 28, 2009.
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amended to permit parental notification for abortion." 7 Ballot measures aimed at overturning the California Supreme Court's decision
in American Academy of Pediatrics,8' however, have been rejected
three times by California voters, 8 9 including a failed initiative in
November 2008.90 The possibility of backlash against progressive
state court decisions expanding protection for abortion is real and
must be anticipated and countered through public education initiatives that educate voters about the true intent behind and dangers
posed by abortion restrictions.3 9 1
CONCLUSION

As Justice Brennan wrote over three decades ago, "the very
premise of the [Supreme Court's] cases that foreclose federal remedies
constitutes a clear call to state courts to step into the breach."3 92 The
path from Roe to Casey to Carharthas been a steady downward spiral
of diminishing federal constitutional protection for abortion rights.
The history of reproductive rights litigation in state courts powerfully demonstrates that state courts have played an important role
in strengthening protection for abortion rights in many states. In
future years, state court decisions may also positively influence federal courts to change course and revitalize federal protection for abortion rights. Although independent state constitutional adjudication
is not without limitations and pitfalls, it offers a fruitful alternative
venue for continued litigation as one component of a broad-based
strategy that includes litigation in federal courts, legislative advocacy,
public education, political action, and grass roots organizing.

387. See supranote 279.
388. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997); see supranotes 24668 and accompanying text.
389. See Sharples, supra note 21.
390. Id. California's "Proposition 4, which would have required parental notification
for [young women] under 18 seeking an abortion and mandated a 48-hour waiting period
before the procedure, [was defeated] by a vote of 52% to 48%." Id.
391. See Johnsen, supra note 25, at 9 (arguing that "[piro-choice advocates have not...
found effective ways to communicate... [the] harms [posed by abortion regulations] to
a public that favors keeping abortion legal, but not too easily available").
392. Brennan, supranote 31, at 503.

